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The Development of NATO EBAO
Doctrine: Clausewitz's Theories and the
Role of Law in an Evolving Approach to
Operations
Colonel Jody M. Prescott*
I. Introduction
The role of law in military operations today is pervasive, and it
contributes significantly to the complexity of the international security
environment.' The practice of "operational law," as it is often called,
requires legal advisors on military operations to be competent in areas of
the law as diverse as environmental law, contracts, claims and human
rights in addition to the more typical bodies of law that one would expect
in a military operation, such as the law of armed conflict.2  Legal
complexity is just one of a number of operational aspects that have
forced international organizations to reassess their traditional methods of
conducting military operations. 3 In particular, conflicts since the end of
* Chief Legal Advisor, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The views
expressed in this article are mine, and do not reflect the official views of ISAF, the Joint
Warfare Centre, or the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General's Corps. I wish to thank
Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Kelly Jordan, Lieutenant Colonel Charles Newbegin, Wing
Commander Alexander Mason, Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Michael Davidson, Squadron
Leader Andrew Gannon, and Ms. Mette Hartov for their insightful comments and critique
on this article. Any mistakes are, of course, my own doing.
1. "Modem wars are complex affairs conducted 'among the people' and, as Sir
Richard Dannatt, head of the British army, put it recently, 'in the spotlight of the media
and in the shadow of international lawyers."' After Smart Weapons, Smart Soldiers,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 27, 2007, at 33; Michael Kelly, Legal Factors in Military Planning for
Coalition Warfare and Military Interoperability: Some Implications for the Australian
Defence Force, 2 AUSTL. ARMY J., Autumn 2005, at 161-71, available at
http://www.apcml.org/documents/aajautumn05-kelly_ 7.pdf.
2. See U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-100, LEGAL SUPPORT TO
OPERATIONS, 3-2 through 3-16 (Mar. 1, 2000).
3. See, e.g., Cedric de Coning, The Implications of the Integrated Missions Concept
for Training in United Nations and African Union Peace Operations, PEACEKEEPING THIS
MONTH, July 17, 2007, available at http://www.apsta-africa.org/news/article
17072007.php.
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the Cold War have shown that the mere coincident use of military force
alongside civilian reconstruction and development programs in an
operational environment is not sufficient to set the conditions conducive
to a stable and lasting peace.4 Accustomed in the past to working largely
independently of one another, military and civilian efforts often lacked
the horizontal coordination between them necessary for practical
cooperation at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of operations.5
Further, the use of their respective conventional planning, execution and
assessment techniques did not always generate the necessary vertical
coherence in strategy implementation between the different levels of
their operations that would ensure their plans were effectively carried
out. 6  Finally, military and civilian organizations have realized that
certain conditions necessary to build a stable and lasting peace, such as
establishing the rule of law, can be challenging to achieve using
traditional approaches.7
Within NATO, for example, recognition of these problems has led
to two closely related initiatives: the Comprehensive Approach and the
Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO).8 The Comprehensive
Approach began as a Danish effort that primarily sought to achieve better
political coordination between NATO and other strategic level
organizations such as the UN and EU.9 This initiative was based in part
4. Ambassador Friis Ame Petersen, Embassy of Den., Washington, D.C.,
Presentation at NATO Comprehensive Approach Workshop (May 25, 2007),
http://www.ambwashington.um.dk/en/menu/TheEmbassy/AmbassadorsGreeting/Ambass
adorsSpeechesandPublications/AmbassadorFriisArnePetersensPresentationAtNATOCom
prehensiveApproachWorkshop.htm.
5. De Coning, supra note 3. See also U.S. Military Authorities and
Nongovernmental Humanitarian Organizations Establish Guidelines on Relations in
Hostile Environments, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 877, 877-78 (2007) (collaborating between
government officials and a group of U.S. nongovernmental organizations to develop
"'rules of the road' to guide relations between U.S. military forces and humanitarian
organizations in conflict zones.").
6. Petersen, supra note 4.
7. See, e.g., de Coning, supra note 3; THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP REPORT 6, 54 (2006),
available at http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq-study_-group report/report/1206/index.html;
TIMO NOETZEL & SIBYLLE SCHEIPERS, COALITION WARFARE IN AFGHANISTAN: BURDEN-
SHARING OR DISUNITY? 3-4 (Chatham House Briefing Paper, Oct. 2007), available at
http://ccw.politics.ox.ac.uk/publications/scheipers-0567-bpO07afghanistan.pdf.
8. Tim Williams, The Road to Riga & the Path Ahead. NATO's Transformation
Agenda before and after the Riga Summit, ROYAL UNITED SERV. INST. FOR DEF. AND SEC.
STUDIES, http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/TheRoadtoRigaand thePath_
Ahead.pdf (last visited May 24, 2008); Michael Romba & Ralph Thiele, Networked
Security in the German Forces, J. JAPCC 29, 2007 Edition 5, 29, 29-30.
9. Petersen, supra note 4. Importantly, the respective comprehensive approaches of
NATO and the EU reflect their different missions and different resources. NATO's
emphasis is on the military strengths of the alliance, while the EU focuses on "the
mixture of available instruments [i.e., economic] and the positive perception of softpower
by other actors [as] EU advantages." EUMS-IMS Roundtable Meeting on
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upon the successful Danish experience at the national level with
statutorily required civil-military cooperation in operations in the
Balkans.10 The NATO leadership endorsed this concept at the Riga
Summit in 2006, and directed the North Atlantic Council to propose
pragmatic measures to "improve coherent application of NATO's own
crisis management instruments," and to enhance the interface of civilian
and military efforts with organizations such as the UN, non-
governmental organizations, and local actors.'
If the comprehensive approach represents NATO's overarching
political concept for devising an improved way of conducting NATO
operations in general, then EBAO may be best described as the
implementation of the Comprehensive Approach in a military context.
In general, EBAO seeks to create a more holistic picture of the
operational environment to enhance military planning, the conduct of
operations, and the assessment of the efficacy of those operations.
12
Within this broader view, commanders and staffs at all levels should then
be able to synchronize their efforts with those of other governmental,
international, and non-governmental organizations.13 This
synchronization of actors is intended to allow the military headquarters
personnel to focus effectively on the objectives directed by their political
leaders for accomplishment. These political objectives must be met in
order to succeed in the military phases of an operation and to create
"effects." "Effects" here meaning changes to perceptions, behavior, and
capabilities, that must be brought about among the various actors in the
operational environment to accomplish these objectives. !4 The concepts
behind EBAO are neither new' 5 nor applicable only to military
Comprehensive Approach (CA) and Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO),
meeting report, 6b, Enclosure 1, INT'L MIL. STAFF, IMSTAM(P&P)-0039-2007 (Dec.
20, 2007) (unpublished, on file with NATO).
10. Petersen, supra note 4.
11. Williams, supra note 8.
12. Romba & Thiele, supra note 8, at 32.
13. BI-STRATEGIC COMMAND PRE-DOCTRINAL HANDBOOK (EFFECTS BASED
APPROACH TO OPERATIONS), Supreme Allied Commanders, Europe and Transformation
1-I to 1-3 (Oct. 1, 2007) [hereinafter PRE-DOCTRINAL HANDBOOK]. "Bi-Strategic" refers
to the two strategic-level commands within NATO, Allied Command Operations (better
known as Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, or SHAPE) located in Mons,
Belgium, and Allied Command Transformation, located in Norfolk, Virginia. This term
came into common usage after the reorganization in 2003, though it has not formally
been adopted.
14. Id. at 2-1 to 2-4.
15. See Justin Kelly & David Kilcullen, Chaos Versus Predictability: A Critique of
Effects-Based Operations, 2 AUSTL. ARMY J., Winter 2004, at 88, available at
http://www.defence.gov.au/army/lwsc/docs/AAJ-Winter 2004.pdf. These authors
suggest that the modem formulation of EBAO has its roots in early Soviet strategic
thinking. See id. Others note that the concept itself dates back at least to the writings of
2008]
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operations.' 6 EBAO assessment mechanisms are particularly important,
because they should allow adjustments in the strategies and actions used
to generate these "effects" more quickly than traditional military
planning and assessment techniques. 17
Before these holistic methodologies can be effectively implemented
within NATO, however, the personnel who are to use them must be
trained in their use. Proper training will require well-developed
education and training programs, which in turn must be based upon
empirically validated and intellectually accessible doctrine. As the U.S.
military determined in writing its new counterinsurgency manual,
doctrine appropriate for dealing with the new international security
environment requires a holistic approach in its construction. 18 Similarly,
the holistic nature of EBAO suggests that the development of EBAO
doctrine should also reflect the operational holism which it is intended to
help implement. Ideally, therefore, the reference bases upon which the
doctrine is constructed should themselves be operationally holistic, and
should, for example, address the impact of law on contemporary military
operations. This article argues that the theories of 1 9 th century Prussian
general Carl von Clausewitz, as found in his major work, On War, meet
these criteria and should be a fundamental reference base for NATO
EBAO doctrine.
the ancient Chinese military thinker, Sun Tzu. See, e.g., Joshua Ho, The Dimensions of
Effect Based Operations: A View From Singapore, 2 AUSTL. ARMY J., Winter 2004, at 99,
http://www.defence.gov.au/army/lwsc/docs/AAJWinter_2004.pdf.
16. For example, Los Angeles has had a problem with gangs for a number of years.
The police have recently been implementing a new strategy that does not focus on
eliminating gangs, but instead upon changing their criminal behavior. First, the police
publicly focused attention on eleven gangs that were particularly troublesome. The
attention did not consist of direct law enforcement action, but rather of indirect, harassing
action. Violent gangs found themselves subject to measures that disrupted their
organizations rather than confronting them with force, such as civil injunctions and the
rigorous enforcement of probation restrictions. Gangs whose behavior was less violent
did not attract the same degree of police attention. Further, the police strategy addressed
the behavior of ordinary, law-abiding citizens as well. A map that showed the territories
of the various gangs was distributed, which allowed prospective homebuyers to
determine whether the properties they were looking at were located in particular gang
areas. As a result of this approach, one significant indicator of gang violence, gang
murders, has dropped almost 30 percent. See Living with Cockroaches, ECONOMIST, Aug.
2, 2007, at 26. The use of law in this police strategy, including both criminal and civil
legal processes rather than just direct law enforcement actions such as arrests, reflects the
recognition of law's extensive impact upon operations of this nature.
17. PRE-DOCTRINAL HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 7-1 to 7-11.
18. See Posting of John Nagl to Small Wars Journal, http://smallwars
joumal.com/blog/2007/06/the-evolution-and-importance-o/ (June 27, 2007 19:35 EST).
The new U.S. Stability Operations manual also reflects this approach. See Michael R.
Gordon, New Weight in Army Manual on Stabilizing War-Torn Areas, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
8,2008, at Al, available at 2008 WLNR 2437729.
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Clausewitz's theories have been both lauded and criticized since On
War was first published in 1832, and they have been interpreted in many
different ways by political and military writers across the spectra of
nationality and political persuasion. 19 To the extent that On War can be
generalized, it reflects a keen appreciation on Clausewitz's part of the
importance of the study of history in understanding political and military
affairs,2°  and Clausewitz's admiration of Niccol6 Machiavelli's
forthright description of the political and military realities of his time.
Like Machiavelli, Clausewitz focused on these realities, rather than
ethical considerations, as being determinative in the exercise of political
power in the relationships between different nations. 21 Despite having
been written over 175 years ago, Clausewitz's theories continue to enjoy
significant currency with contemporary theorists and writers on military,
political and business strategy.2 In particular, recent commentators have
recognized the strong relationships between Clausewitz's theories and
the field of non-linear dynamics, or so-called "chaos theory.' Non-
linear dynamics recognize that in complex systems, such as armed
conflicts, small differences in initial starting conditions can lead to trends
which produce results that are both very different from and also
disproportionate to the initial events from which they sprang.2 4 This is in
part because of feedback loops that exist in these systems that act to
reinforce the impact of the original small differences in the starting
conditions, causing trends to develop in an exponential, non-linear
fashion.25 An appropriate illustration of this is the old saying, "For want
19. CLAUSEWITZ AND MODERN STRATEGY 12, 214-15 (Michael I. Handel ed., 1986);
Michael Howard, Introduction to CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 27-44 (Peter Paret &
Michael Howard eds., 1976).
20. See Jon Tetsuro Sumida, The Relationship of History and Theory in On War: the
Clausewitzian Ideal and its Implications, 65 J. MIL. HIST. 333, 340 (2001) (describing the
significance of history in Clausewitz's writings).
21. See PETER PARET, CLAUSEWITZ AND THE STATE: THE MAN, His THEORIES, AND
His TIMES 170-77 (Princeton Univ. Press 1985).
22. See, e.g., CLAUSEWITZ ON STRATEGY: INSPIRATION AND INSIGHT FROM A MASTER
STRATEGIST (Tiha von Ghyczy et al. eds., 2001); BEATRICE HEUSER, READING
CLAUSEWITZ (2002); Steve Michael, Air Force Doctrine and Leadership, 15 AEROSPACE
POWER J. 86 (2001). But see, e.g., Bruce Fleming, Can Reading Clausewitz Save Us from
Future Mistakes? PARAMETERS, U.S. ARMY WAR COLL. Q., Spring 2004, at 62; Jeff
Huber, Clausewitz is Dead, 117 U.S. NAVAL INST. PROC. 119 (2001).
23. See Alan Beyerchen, Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War,
17 INT'L SEC. 59 (1992).
24. Linda P. Beckerman, The Non-Linear Dynamics of War, Sci. Applications Int'l
Corp. ASSET Group 3, 8 (Apr. 20, 1999) (unpublished paper), available at
http://www.calresco.org/beckermnlnonlindy.htm.
25. Id. at 6. As Dr. Beyerchen argued in his influential article, "[m]y claim here is
not that Clausewitz somehow anticipated today's 'chaos theory,' but that he perceived
and articulated the nature of war as an energy-consuming phenomenon involving
2008]
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of a nail the shoe was lost, for want of a shoe the horse was lost, and for
want of a horse the rider was lost."' 26 A more modem example is the
concept of the "strategic corporal," that is, the possibility of tactical level
actors behaving in such a way that their actions have strategic level
impacts. 27 Other writers have noted the relationship between non-linear
dynamics and EBAO, 28 and the relationship between EBAO and
Clausewitz's theories. 29 This broad acceptance of his work suggests that
On War could be a likely candidate for inclusion into a NATO EBAO
doctrine base. From a doctrinal perspective, however, there is a problem:
Clausewitz's theories appear to almost completely discount the role of
law in military operations. As he states near the beginning of On War,
[W]ar is thus an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will.
Force, to counter opposing force, equips itself with the inventions of
art and science. Attached to force are certain self-imposed,
imperceptible limitations hardly worth mentioning, known as
international law and custom, for they scarcely weaken it. Force-
that is physical force, for moral force has no existence save as
expressed in the state and law-is thus the means of war, to impose
our will on the enemy is its object.3°
Regardless of the need for EBAO doctrine and the theoretical and
historical credibility Clausewitz's theories enjoy with contemporary
audiences, is it sound to base NATO EBAO doctrine, even in part, on a
body of work which seems so out of touch with the reality of the role of
law in today's international security environment? As stated above, this
article argues that the answer to this question is an unequivocal "yes."
Firstly, in resolving this apparently fundamental inconsistency, this
article will expand upon the necessity for doctrine, and the development
of EBAO within NATO, to explain more fully the need for operationally
holistic doctrine upon which to base NATO education and training.
competing and interactive factors, attention to which reveals a messy mix of order and
unpredictability." Beyerchen, supra note 23, at 70.
26. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, POOR RICHARD'S ALMANAC (1757), quoted in FAMILIAR
QUOTATIONS (John Bartlett ed., 10th ed. 1919).
27. Lynda Liddy, The Strategic Corporal: Some Requirements in Training and
Education, 2 AUSTL. ARMY J, Autumn 2005, at 139-41, available at
http://www.defence.gov.au/army/lwsc/docs/AAJ Autumn05.pdf. The actions of certain
U.S. soldiers at Abu Ghraib who abused Iraqi detainees is a negative example of this
concept in practice. See THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAI1 383-1165
(Karen Greenberg & Joshua Dratel eds., 2005).
28. Kelly & Kilcullen, supra note 15, at 90; Ho, supra note 15, at 103.
29. Antulio J. Echevarria II, Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: Changing Our
Warfighting Doctrine-Again! 13 (Strategic Studies Institute, Sept. 2002), available at
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB363.pdf, Kelley & Kilcullen,
supra note 15, at 97.
30. CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 75 (Peter Paret & Michael Howard eds., 1976).
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Secondly, it will explore some concerns regarding the use of EBAO in
order to more completely illustrate the challenges presented in
developing doctrine for these methodologies. Thirdly, Clausewitz's
education and experiences will be reviewed, to provide the reader with a
better appreciation of the context within which he developed his theories.
The following section will briefly describe his theories and ideas,
primarily as set out in On War, and specifically focus on what he
perceived the impact of law upon military operations to be. Against this
backdrop, the fifth section will assess the development of international
law up to the time of his last refinements of the draft of On War to
demonstrate the consistency of his views on law with the state of its
development at that time. Finally, this article will factor the current role
of law in military operations into his theories on armed conflict to show
how they can be accommodated without warping them to such an extent
that they would lose their identity and their value for modem doctrine
writers, educators and trainers, and students.
II. The Necessity for NATO EBAO Doctrine and its Current State of
Development
Certain NATO headquarters today, such as the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, are using some form of
EBAO to plan, conduct and assess their missions.31 Within NATO, work
is also underway not just to formulate a doctrinal basis acceptable to all
the Allies, but to provide useful guidance to commanders and staffs on
how to work with EBAO concepts and systems as well. 32 For example, a
Bi-Strategic Command working group, in cooperation with the Joint
Warfare Centre (JWC) in Stavanger, Norway, has drafted the Pre-
doctrinal EBAO Handbook for NATO forces 33 and has also drafted the
Engagement Space Assessment Handbook.34 In Stand Alone Experiment
(SAE) Enabler 08, an experiment conducted at the JWC in February
2008, a military staff, including a legal advisor, engaged in operational
planning using the NATO EBAO lexicon and concepts found in these
staff guides to determine whether the documents were useful in EBAO
31. Williams, supra note 8, at 2-3.
32. Charles Newbegin, NATO Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO)
Concept, 11 THE THREE SwoRDS 5 (2007).
33. See PRE-DOCTRINAL HANDBOOK, supra note 13; see also JOINT WARFIGHTING
CTR. ET AL., COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK FOR AN EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH TO JOINT
OPERATIONS (2006).
34. HEADQUARTERS, SUPREME ALLIED COMMAND TRANSFORMATION, ENGAGEMENT
SPACE ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, VERSION 1, ENCLOSURE 2 TO 5000 TI-35/SER: NU OCT
07 (Oct. 2007).
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planning, and whether improvements in both could be made. 35  This
developmental work is of interest to jurists because the implementation
of EBAO could significantly expand the role of law and the role of legal
advisors in contemporary military operations.36 Because EBAO should
result in military organizations working more closely with governments
37
and other civilian organizations, military headquarters would need to be
more aware of the laws and regulations pertinent to the functioning of
these non-military actors. This suggests a broader staff role for military
legal advisors in EBAO, and a requirement for them to undergo more
specialized legal training and education in the fields of international and
comparative law. 38 Likewise, it also suggests a need for legal advisors
working for the civilian actors to become better acquainted with the
practice of operational law, and with military staff working procedures in
general.39
Although there are widespread efforts to develop EBAO in a
practical fashion,4 ° much of the existing general literature on EBAO
focuses instead on its theoretical bases 41 and its application at the higher
levels of command.42 From a doctrinal perspective, certain influential
military organizations outside NATO have expressed reservations with
the implementation of EBAO at the strategic and operational levels. For
example, the command responsible for training and the development of
35. Author's notes, SAE Enabler 08, Ulsnes Training Centre, Hundvhg, Norway,
February 25-29, 2008.
36. PRE-DOCTR1NAL HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 6-4 to 6-5.
37. PRE-DOCTRINAL HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at Annex C (discussing examples of
EBAO Thinking Applied to NATO Operations).
38. PRE-DOCTRINAL HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 6-4 to 6-5; Jody M. Prescott,
EBAO andIts ImplicationsforACT, 6 THE THREE SWORDS 11, 14 (2006).
39. Id.; Jody M. Prescott, Training EBAO and Humanitarian Considerations in
Operations: Blue Force Looks Within, 8 THE THREE SWORDS 25, 28-29 (2007).
40. For example, in March 2008 the Baltic Defence College in Tartu, Estonia, hosted
a two-day conference entitled "Effects-Based Approach to Operations: Challenges and
Perspectives," which included EBAO presentations from the U.S., the U.K., France,
Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. See Baltic Defence College,
http://www.bdcol.ee/?id= 16 (last visited March 14, 2008).
41. See, e.g., Andrew Ilachinski, Land Warfare and Complexity, Part II: An
Assessment of the Applicability of Nonlinear Dynamics and Complex Systems Theory to
the Study of Land Warfare (Center for Naval Analyses, 1996), available at
http://www.cna.org/isaac/lwl.pdf, Edward A. Smith, Complexity, Networking, and
Effects Based Approaches to Operations (Dep't of Defense Command and Control
Research Program, July 2006), available at http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Smith-
Complexity.pdf.
42. See, e.g., EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH TO MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS, CONCEPT
OF OPERATIONS (CONOPS) WITH IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES, VERSION 1.0, U.S. Joint
Forces Command, Joint Experimentation Directorate (July 7, 2006) (copy on file with
author); DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS OF OPERATIONAL NET ASSESSMENT (ONA), JOINT
DOCTRINE SERIES, PAMPHLET 4, U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center
(Feb. 24, 2004) (copy on file with author).
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doctrine in one branch of the U.S. military has found some aspects of
EBAO useful, but has postponed training on it until more work is done to
develop the concept, validate it, and write doctrine on its use.43  The
requirement for training and education packages based on well-
developed and empirically validated doctrine is noted by several
militaries as being necessary prior to comprehensive implementation of
EBAO.4 4 This concern appears well founded. In the national context,
within a joint headquarters for example, this could lead to commanders
and staffs of different branches of a country's armed forces using
inconsistent terminology and definitions, and not fully understanding the
EBAO processes and products they are supposed to be using. Within a
multinational headquarters, depending upon the different military
cultures, the language skills, the differing national interpretations of
EBAO, and the training and experiences of individual commanders and
staff officers, a lack of doctrinal uniformity would likely increase the risk
of miscommunication and misunderstanding of problems.45 The lack of
well-developed NATO EBAO doctrine, therefore, not only complicates
putting effective EBAO systems into place, but it also handicaps the
human operators needed to make the systems work. Given the confusion
that the lack of doctrine could cause among military personnel, it would
be unrealistic to expect officials and representatives of civilian
organizations unfamiliar with the concept to understand EBAO and
participate in EBAO planning and execution in a meaningful way.
Unlike military personnel, these individuals would not necessarily be
43. Memorandum from Director of Futures Center, U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Command, to Commandants of Training and Doctrine Command Schools,
Regarding Effects Based Concepts and Doctrine in Army Education 3-4 (Dec. 22, 2005)
(copy on file with author). General Mattis, the commander of U.S. Joint Forces
Command and of Supreme Allied Command Transformation, has assessed the complex
systems of analysis used by U.S. Joint Forces Command ("USJFCOM") in support of
Effects Based Operations as ineffective, and has directed their use be discontinued.
James N. Mattis, USJFCOM Commander's Guidance for Effects-based Operations, 51
JOINT FORCES Q. 105, 108 (2008). He specifically noted, however, that NATO's use of
effects-based concepts is different because it is part of the comprehensive approach.
Accordingly, General Mattis stated that he "did not address NATO's use of EBAO in this
USJFCOM commander's guidance." Id. at 106.
44. See Ministry of Defence of Great Britain, THE UK MILITARY EFFECTS-BASED
APPROACH, JOINT DOCTRINE NOTE 1/05 1-12 (2005); Australian Defense Force, Effects
Based Operations Discussion Paper 30 101, 102 (Nov. 25, 2003), available at
http://www.defence.gov.au/strategy/fwc/documents/ebo-dp.pdf.
45. See Ion Vlad & lulian Berdila, Effects-Based Operations: A New Approach to
Armed Conflict, 2 ROM. MIL. THINKING 57, 58 (2006) (noting the potential negative
effects when new concepts are misunderstood and the need to avoid "raw copying" of
military concepts into other languages and military cultures); SAE Enabler, supra note 35
(even a well trained experiment audience from a multinational headquarters staff who
were experienced in working with EBAO expended precious planning time revisiting and
discussing the provided EBAO concepts and terms definitions).
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able to rely upon their staff experiences and operational art to help them
muddle through a convoluted military staffing process.46 They would
need training and education, based upon doctrine, in order to understand
how EBAO are supposed to work at the various levels of command.47
As noted previously, in keeping with the holistic nature of EBAO, this
sort of doctrine should ideally include reference bases that reflect
operational holism.
Currently, NATO defines its EBAO as "the coherent and
comprehensive application of the various instruments of the Alliance
combined with the practical cooperation along with non-NATO actors, to
create effects necessary to achieve planned objectives and ultimately the
NATO end state" in the operational environment.48 The operational
environment itself is called an "engagement space., 49 The engagement
space is divided into military, political, economic and civil "domains. 5°
For example, the political domain includes the use of diplomacy, and the
civil domain includes the areas of public information and governmental
infrastructure. 5' An "action" is the use of "any Alliance instrument at
any level" which seeks to achieve an "effect," or behavioral change, in a
domain. 52 At the tactical level of operations, actions are translated into
specific tasks and activities conducted by NATO units.53  The
aggregation of effects in the domains leads to the accomplishment of
"objectives," or intended outcomes, agreed upon by the North Atlantic
Council (NATO's governing body).54  These objectives support
46. Of course, individual career civil servants may have had military staff
experience, and even those who have not will likely have had significant staffing
experience within their own agencies. However, as discussed infra, notes 45 through 81,
an EBAO can be a complex, self-contained system of interrelated systems of concepts,
hardware, and software - it is not necessarily intuitive. See infra notes 54-81.
47. De Coning, supra note 3; Prescott, supra note 38. Importantly, EBAO planners
must always be mindful that many civilian international organizations and non-
governmental organizations will be wary of appearing to compromise their impartiality or
independence by working too closely with military organizations. De Coning, supra note
3.
48. MC Position on an Effects Based Approach to Operations, Secretary General,
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, MCM-0052-2006, at 2 5 (4th Draft) (June 6, 2006)
(unpublished, on file with NATO) [hereinafter "MC Position"].
49. Id. 6a.
50. Id.
51. Id.at4 8.
52. Id. at 2-3 7 6d, 6e. "Effects can be physical and non-physical. Although all
physical effects will lead to some form of non-physical effect, their primary purpose will
be to influence the capabilities of actors, while non-physical effects are principally
directed towards an actor's behaviour[]." PRE-DOCTINAL HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at
2-4.
53. PRE-DOCTRINAL HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 2-5, 7-4.
54. MC Position, supra note 48, at 2 6b.
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achieving the end state.55 For example, if an objective is "Rule of Law is
Established in Country A," a desired effect could be "Country A ceases
support of terrorist organizations." This effect could be created in part
within the political domain through the action of diplomatic pressure by
NATO partners on Country A. Effects include both positive, i.e., desired
effects, and negative, i.e., undesired effects, which are those that "disrupt
or jeopardize the achievement of the objectives." These effects must be
"identified and mitigated if possible" to ensure the success of an
EBAO.56 Horizontal coordination between the actors in the different
domains (military, political, economic and civil) can assist in the
mitigation of undesired effects, but "it cannot mitigate all undesired
effects due to the nature of the action and systems. Undesired effects
related to a soldier committing a heinous crime against a civilian ... for
example, are very hard to mitigate through horizontal coordination.
57
To determine whether the intended effects are in fact being created,
two types of assessment criteria are used, "measures of performance"
and "measures of effectiveness. 58  Measures of performance seek to
answer the question whether planned actions and their supporting tasks
and activities are being conducted properly.59 At the next level of
analysis, measures of effectiveness seek to determine whether the actions
being conducted are indeed the proper ones to bring about the desired
effects. 60  To continue with the example above, a measure of
performance could be "Do meetings with Country A officials
consistently address NATO's policy on terrorism?" An appropriate
measure of the effectiveness of these discussions could be "Decreased
frequency of official statements by Country A officials supporting
terrorists." The purpose of EBAO is not to make military operations
more predictable, but rather to make military units more adaptable
through determining which actions are having positive results, and which
are not. 61 The collection of relevant information within the engagement
space, its timely and accurate analysis, and its subsequent flow through
the military organizational hierarchy is crucial to the effectiveness of
EBAO. 62  Translating these concepts into a holistically-aware,
functioning system, however, presents challenges of which EBAO
doctrine writers, trainers, and educators must be aware.
55. Id.
56. PRE-DOCTRINAL HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 2-4.
57. PRE-DOCTRINAL HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at Annex F5, Figure H-6 and
accompanying text.
58. PRE-DOCTRINAL HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 7-1 to 7-3.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Newbegin, supra note 32, at 7.
62. PRE-DOCTRINAL HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 7-4 to 7-11.
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III. Concerns Regarding the Use of EBAO
The previously noted reservations on the part of certain military
organizations to EBAO on the basis of lack of doctrine are also reflected
in the concerns of various writers as to the efficacy of EBAO and the
scopes of work in different EBAO-related projects. Commentators have
noted the significant technological and financial challenges of
developing and maintaining a suite of computer hardware and software
sufficient to support the holistic picture of the engagement space required
in EBAO.63 Others doubt whether such a picture can ever really be fully
developed given the nature of armed conflict, 64 and some question what
they see as the current lack of emphasis on incorporating human
elements into EBAO.65 One project in particular seeks to address the gap
in information and analysis flow between the tactical and higher levels of
command, a gap which must be bridged to ensure vertical coherence in
EBAO application throughout a military organization.66
To best appreciate the merits of these concerns, oddly enough, it is
useful to consider them against the backdrop of two successful U.S.
field-level EBAO-like initiatives in Afghanistan and Iraq: the field
Political Advisor (POLAD) and the Human Terrain Team (HTT). As to
the use of POLADs in the field, the U.S. Department of State now has
personnel serving on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in
Afghanistan and Iraq.67 While some of these personnel are attached to
conventional forces, others are collocated with special operations forces,
63. Ho, supra note 15, at 103-04. See also PONTUS HORLING ET AL., SWE. MINISTRY
OF DEFENCE, A SURVEY OF SOME INFORMATION FUSION RESEARCH FIELDS APPLICABLE IN
OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (2006), available at http://www.foi.se/infofusion/
bilder/FOI-R-2000-SE.pdf.
64. Kelly & Kilcullen, supra note 15, at 87, 95, 97.
65. Ho, supra note 15, at 102, 104. "To date, US attempts to implement EBO have
been focused mainly on the technological dimension of war. Successful conduct of
EBAO requires more than the acquisition of sophisticated software and hardware
systems. Despite all human efforts to instrumentalize war, a Clausewitzian fog remains
inevitable in human conflict. As a result, it will continue to focus strongly on the human
dimension of war." Id. at 104.
66. See An Assessment Methodology for Effects Based Operations, in Proposals
Submitted to Dep't of Defense Small Business Innovation Research,
http://www.dodsbir.net/solicitation/sbir072/army072.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2008).
67. Dan Green, Counter-Insurgency Diplomacy: Political Advisors at the
Operational and Tactical Levels, MIL. REV., May-June 2007, at 24. PRTS are usually
national teams ordinarily composed of military personnel and civilian government agency
personnel with expertise in a wide range of disciplines. The Kandahar PRT, for example,
is a Canadian 330-member team that includes "diplomats, developments experts, the
Canadian police ... and the military. It supports key initiatives in the province and
carries out a broad range of enabling roles such as police training and strengthening local
governance capacity." Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team, http:l/www.
canadainternational.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/kandahar/kprt-eprk.aspx (last visited Aug.
28, 2008).
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along with U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S.
Department of Agriculture, Civil Affairs, and contract police advisor
personnel. 68 These civil-military interface groupings bring perspectives,
contacts, and skills to the field that are especially relevant to
accomplishing objectives for which the conventional military forces are
not ordinarily trained and equipped, such as establishing the rule of
law.69 The field POLAD, for example, can help facilitate governance at
the local level in Afghanistan through helping to organize provincial
shuras.70 As one PRT POLAD found, bolstering the provincial shura in
his area had effects that rippled outside of improving governance.71
When special forces in his area detained local Afghans, shura members
would often provide him with useful information regarding the
individuals, and why their detention was unnecessary.72 The shuras also
provided opportunities for local communities to express their concerns
regarding military security efforts, which sometimes allowed the military
to alter their plans so as to minimize the potential impact on civilians.73
The same PRT also helped organize a chamber of commerce in the
provincial capital.74  The chamber's meetings eventually became
monthly, and helped provide the PRT with information about the local
economy, and the local businessmen with an opportunity to address
complaints to local officials. 75 As this particular PRT POLAD noted:
Though not often viewed as the type of activity considered integral to
a successful counterinsurgency strategy (bolstering indigenous
security forces and the local government being the usual means), the
creation of a viable civil society that can improve living conditions
and government responsiveness is a useful supplement to kinetic
operations.
7 6
Similarly, in the estimation of one U.S. brigade commander, the use
of an HTT, an embedded team of specialists including at least one
anthropologist, decreased his unit's need for combat operations in his
area of responsibility by 60% in the eight months since the team had
68. Green, supra note 67, at 25.
69. See id. at 25-26.
70. Id. at 26 (defining a "shura" as a traditional meeting of Afghan elders).
71. Id. at 26-27.
72. Id.
73. See Green, supra note 67, at 27.
74. Id. at 28.
75. Id.
76. Id. The "use of information is frequently referred to as 'soft-power' or 'non-
kinetic' as contrasted with the military use of kinetic (both lethal and non-lethal) means
to physically attack a target." U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, INFORMATION OPERATIONS
PRIMER, DEP'T OF MILITARY STRATEGY, PLANNING AND OPERATIONS 2 (2007), available
at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/info-ops-primer.pdf.
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arrived. 77 For example, during a battalion-level combat operation in the
summer of 2007, an anthropologist determined that one village had an
unusually high proportion of widows.78 These women naturally looked
to their sons for financial support, and in the anthropologist's view, this
could put pressure on the young men to join the relatively well-paid
insurgents.79 In response, and on the anthropologist's advice, the U.S.
military developed a job training program for the widows.8° In addition
to advising commanders, the team also maintained a database of local
leaders and tribes, and social, economic, and political disputes.81
Recognizing the self-perpetuating cycle of kinetic operations against
insurgents alienating the civilian population and creating more
insurgents, one anthropologist described her job as going "back and
enhance[ing] the military's understanding ... so that we don't make the
same mistakes we did in Iraq.",
82
The database developed by the HTTs described above is likely very
useful to the U.S. forces at the tactical level. However, even if the
financial and technological challenges to effective integration of this
database and its contents into systems at higher levels of command are
solved, there is still a need for doctrine. The doctrine will guide the users
of this information and guide analysis at the different command levels in
their actual work with it. Similarly, both the field POLADs and the
embedded anthropologists show the necessity for EBAO to incorporate
human elements as seen from multidisciplinary perspectives to be
successful. Without doctrine to guide the development of educational
and training programs, it would likely be difficult to create instructional
packages that would uniformly deal with these sorts of subjects-
83
subjects that are not ordinarily part of military education or training.
Further, the success of these innovations also illustrates the need to
create new tools for use in the field to support and implement the EBAO
77. See David Rohde, Army Enlists Anthropology in War Zones, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5,
2007, at Al, available at 2007 WLNR 19493172.
78. Id.
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. See id.
82. Rhode, supra note 77. The use of HTTs is controversial. Certain
anthropologists believe the use of these teams is unethical, and damaging to the conduct
of anthropological research in the field. Sharon Jayson, Anthropologists' War Role Is
Hardly Academic, USA TODAY, Nov. 28, 2007, at 10D, available at 2007 WLNR
23469837.
83. Training for EBAO will likely need to include familiarizing the "strategic
corporal" with her role in this methodology, so that she understands the significance of
completing her tasks properly and the information from the field that she will need to
feed into the assessment mechanism. See Liddy, supra note 27.
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processes and products at the higher levels of command.14  Efficient
development of these tools will cost money, and their conceptual
templates will require empirical validation and authoritative guidance to
ensure their coherent development and integration into EBAO systems.
Finally, confirming the previously mentioned criteria for EBAO doctrine,
these examples show that the doctrine itself will likely need to be
qualitatively different from typical military doctrine; specifically, it
needs to be more holistic to be fully effective.
IV. Clausewitz's Military, Political and Educational Experiences
Clausewitz spent nearly his entire adult life in the Prussian Army,
having joined as a cadet in 1792 at the age of twelve. 5 Such a lengthy
military career was not uncommon at the time. 86 The wide range of
military, political and educational experiences that he had in his 40 years
of service, most of them at a relatively young age, were atypical,
however. The opportunities that Clausewitz had to reflect upon and
study his experiences, and the use he made of that time to commit his
research and thinking to writing, further distinguish him from his
contemporaries. Most importantly for purposes of this article, the sum of
these circumstances imbues On War with a degree of holism, both in
content and in construction, matched by few other historical military
writings.
A. During the French Revolution and the Early Napoleonic Wars
By the time he was admitted in 1801 to the school in Berlin that
would become the Prussian War College, 87 Clausewitz was already the
veteran of two years of small unit combat against French forces in the
Rhineland and Alsace-Lorraine. His time at the War College proved to
be very important in the formulation of his ideas, for he soon became the
prize pupil of the college's new director, the military reformer General
Gerhard von Scharnhorst. 8 To the aristocracy of the absolutist state that
84. See Jody Prescott, EBAO and NATO Operational Claims, 10 THE THREE
SwoRDs 5, 9 (2007). Such "tools" could include measures such as increasing the number
of diplomatic personnel available at the higher levels of command. Nicholas Kralev,
State Doubles Military Advisors, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2008, at Al, available at 2008
WLNR 1047733.
85. PARET, supra note 21, at 19.
86. Willerd R. Fann, On the Infantryman's Age in Eighteenth Century Prussia, 41
MiL. AFF. 165, 166 (1977). In fact, two thirds of Frederick the Great's grenadiers, the
Prussian Army's shock troops, would have been too old for the U.S. draft in World War
II. Id. at 167.
87. PARET, supra note 21, at 68.
88. Id. at 74-75.
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he served, Scharnhorst's ideas on reforming the Prussian military were
disquieting, perhaps even radical.89  Scharnhorst advocated better
military education, advancement based on merit, the use of conscription
rather than mercenaries, and the more just application of military
discipline. 90 As a teacher, Scharnhorst encouraged the study of history
and the critical analysis of the various theories of war. In Clausewitz's
words, "[h]e taught that part of war which until then had scarcely been
dealt with on the lecture platform and in books, war as it actually is." 91
Equally important, Clausewitz developed an appreciation for the social,
political and military energy that the French Revolution had liberated by
involving the entire nation, rather than just a governing elite, in France's
wars. 92
Clausewitz excelled at his studies, and was appointed adjutant to
Prince August, a nephew of the Prussian king, who commanded a
grenadier battalion in Berlin.93  This position brought him into close
contact with the ruling Prussian aristocracy, contact that had a significant
impact upon the development of his views on social and political
issues.94 Importantly, the new social circles in which he moved also
allowed him to meet his future wife, the Countess Marie von Brihl, a
lady in waiting to the Prussian queen mother. 95 Despite their differences
in temperament and the disapproval of her mother,96 the attraction
between them was apparently immediate. 97 Over time, Marie's anti-
French views and nationalism reinforced the similar views held by
Clausewitz, views that were increasingly at odds with the opinions of the
francophilic Prussian monarchy. 98
Clausewitz was captured along with Prince August by French forces
in 1806 following the Prussian army's disastrous defeats at Auerstaedt
and Jena. The two were interned together in France for the better part of
a year.99 Clausewitz and the prince were allowed great freedom of
movement, and what he observed of French politics and culture had a
profound impact upon him. 100  It also provided Clausewitz the
opportunity to take a more objective look at Prussian society, and
89. See W.B. GALLIE, PHILOSOPHERS OF PEACE AND WAR: KANT, CLAUSEWITZ,
MARX AND TOLSTOY 38 (1978).
90. PARET, supra note 21, at 65.
91. Id. at 71 (citation omitted).
92. CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 30, at 9.
93. PARET, supra note 21, at 78.
94. Id. at 98.
95. Id. at 98-99.
96. RAYMOND ARON, CLAUSEWITZ, PHILOSOPHER OF WAR 15 (1983).
97. See PARET, supra note 21, at 98-103.
98. See id. at 104, 109.
99. Handel, supra note 19, at 191.
100. PARET, supra note 21, at 126.
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reassess its shortcomings in political and military matters.' 0 Meanwhile,
back in unoccupied Prussia, Schamhorst had been put in charge of the
commission set up to reorganize the shattered Prussian army. When in
1808 Clausewitz finally made his way to K6nigsberg, the temporary seat
of the Prussian government, he became Schamhorst's personal
assistant. 0 2 Although he was given military positions of ever increasing
importance during this time, 10 3 Clausewitz continued his studies of
philosophy and history, and continued to write essays on military theory
and strategy, politics and history. 0 4 Through his work with Scharnhorst
and his involvement in the reform movement, 0 5 Clausewitz also received
a practical education in the often-contentious politics involved in
transforming the Prussian army into a modem force based on merit and
competence rather than noble privilege.' 
06
B. From Napoleon's Invasion of Russia to the Polish Uprising
In 1812, to protest the Prussian government's decision to provide
troops to Napoleon and to allow him to use Prussia as a staging area for
his invasion of Russia, Clausewitz resigned his Prussian commission and
joined the Russian general staff as an advisor. 10 7 He played a pivotal role
in securing the defection of the Prussian troops under General Yorck von
Wartenburg from Napoleon's army during its retreat from Moscow,
which further hastened the retreat of French forces back towards
France's borders. 10 8 Clausewitz informally rejoined the Prussian forces
by working in Field Marshal Gebhard von Blficher's staff, and was
wounded in the battle of Liltzen in 1813.109 His intellectual and political
independence had not endeared him to the Prussian authorities,"0
101. Id. at 126-36.
102. Handel, supra note 19, at 192.
103. Clausewitz found himself involved at all levels of the reconstruction of the
Prussian army, from instructing officers at the War College on small unit tactics, to
rewriting the operational regulations for the infantry and the cavalry, and even serving as
the crown prince's personal tutor. See PARET, supra note 21, at 145-46, 188.
104. See Handel, supra note 19, at 194 n.6; PARET, supra note 21, at 466 (indexing
Clausewitz's writings).
105. Handel, supra note 19, at 192-93.
106. See CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 30, at 145-46; Peter Paret, The Genesis of On War,
in CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 30, at 3-5, 10.
107. Handel, supra note 19, at 195; PARET, supra note 21, at 230.
108. ARON, supra note 96, at 29.
109. Id. at 30. Clausewitz drafted a plan for guerilla operations against the French in
Silesia, which was not apparently well received by the Prussian authorities. See PARET,
supra note 21, at 239; see also GALLIE, supra note 89, at 39.
110. Handel, supra note 19, at 195.
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however, and he was not allowed to formally rejoin the Prussian army
until shortly before Napoleon's final defeat at Waterloo in 1815."'
In the long peace that followed, Clausewitz found the time to begin
writing again. 12 In 1818, he was assigned to the directorship of the War
College in Berlin." 3 The directorship was basically an unchallenging
administrative position, but it provided him with a promotion to major
general, economic security and a great deal of free time to write." 14
Marie appears to have played a very important role in her husband's
writing of On War, which he began in 1819.' The reform movement in
Prussian politics and the military had largely dissipated by this time, 116
and Clausewitz's reputation as a reformer and a maverick led to him
being denied diplomatic posts that he had sought. 17  Disappointed,
Clausewitz increasingly withdrew from society and socialized primarily
with old friends." 8 Marie's privileged status at the Prussian court and
their similar political ideals, however, provided him with both social
legitimacy in the Prussian capital and a trusted sounding board for his
ideas and writings.' 19 Leaving unfinished the body of writing that would
become On War, Clausewitz left the War College in 1830 to become an
Inspector of the Artillery. 20 His last field assignment was as the chief of
staff for the forces mobilized to guard the frontier with Russian-
controlled Poland during the Polish Uprising that began in 1830.121
Clausewitz died in Breslau on November 16, 1831, shortly after the
successful conclusion of the operation. 122 Marie's deep familiarity with
his work is seen as being instrumental in her efforts after his death to
gather together the drafts and revisions of On War, find the appropriate
editors, and have them published in 1832.123
111. Id.
112. PARET, supra note 21, at 327, 330 (listing Clausewitz's post-war works).
113. Id.at270-71.
114. Id. at 307. Clausewitz also had time to attend lectures at the University of Berlin
on various topics, but especially science. Id. at 310.
115. Handel, supra note 19, at 196-97.
116. See WALTER M. SIMON, THE FAILURE OF THE PRUSSIAN REFORM MOVEMENT
(1971); see also PARET, supra note 21, at 409. In particular, his efforts to modify the
instruction given at the War College were unsuccessful. GALLIE, supra note 89, at 40.
117. See PARET, supra note 21, at 320-23.
118. Id. at 323.
119. Id. at309-10.
120. ARON, supra note 96, at 9.
121. PARET, supra note 21, at 399.
122. See id. at 429.
123. See Marie von Clausewitz, Preface to CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 30, at 65, 65-67.
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V. On War
As a brief review of Clausewitz's career and experiences shows, On
War is the product of a wide-ranging intellect; one shaped during a time
of enormous social, political and military change. Motivated both
professionally and emotionally to understand the nature of armed
conflict, Clausewitz's purpose in writing On War also included finding
ways to apply this understanding in a practical fashion. It is perhaps a
reflection of On War's holism that it has lent itself to so many different
interpretations over the years. This depth likely also explains the
continued acceptance of Clausewitz's theories by contemporary
audiences. To better highlight the relationships between his theories, the
role of law in military operations, and EBAO, for purposes of this article
it is useful to distinguish between Clausewitz's theories on the
conceptual nature of armed conflict, and his ideas and observations on
how armed conflict was actually conducted.
A. Theory ofArmed Conflict
Clausewitz called his theoretical model of armed conflict "absolute
war," which he defined as the escalating application of opposing nations'
full power against each other until one compelled the other's
submission. 124 This model has sometimes been confused with the later
concept of "total war," in the writings of both those who agree and those
who disagree with his theories. 125 As noted previously, in theory at least,
124. CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 30, at 47.
125. Handel, supra note 19, at 12, 214-15. "Total War" has been defined in many
different ways. Sometimes it means "the mobilization of all resources, economic and
military, by a society in support of a war effort; this was the American description of its
own engagement during World War II. It has also been used to mean a willingness to
engage the enemy in any geographic zone, or with any available weaponry, or sometimes
a willingness to fight a scorched-earth campaign, even on one's own territory. It has also
been used to mean war conducted against an enemy's military and economic
infrastructure, across all of its territory, in order to cripple the enemy's ability to wage
war; Great Britain used the term in this sense in both World Wars." CRIMES OF WAR 355
(Roy Gutman & David Rieff eds., 1999); see also Peter Rowe, Total War, Crimes of War
Project The Book webpage, http://www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/total-war.html (last
visited May 29, 2008). Perhaps the most recent definition, and one which particularly
lends itself to EBAO, is that of Professor John Waghelstein, who defines it as follows:
Total war means you use all the elements of national power [ ]. It's at the
grass-roots level that you're trying to win. You can kill enemy soldiers-that's
not the only issue. You also need to dry up their support. You can't just use
the military. It's got to be a constant din of propaganda; it's got to be economic
support; it's got to be electrons. As long as you only go after the guy with the
weapon, you're missing the most important part.
Peter Maas, Professor Nagl's War, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 11, 2004, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9902E6D61531 F932A25752COA9629C8
B63.
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he believed that the only limitations in reaching this extreme state were
physical factors. Moral forces, such as law, had little or no impact. 26
For Clausewitz, an understanding of these physical forces flowed from
the critical examination of the dynamic relationships between the many
variable aspects of war. 1 7  He looked at three different types of
interaction in particular, each representing a different perspective of war,
to describe the processes that lead to variability in its conduct and results.
From his first perspective, Clausewitz described war as a duel
between two opponents. War, therefore,
[i]s not an action of a living force upon a lifeless mass (total non-
resistance would be no war at all) but always the collision of two
living forces. The ultimate aim of waging war ... must be taken as
applying to both sides. Once again, there is interaction. So long as I
have not overthrown my opponent I am bound to fear he may
overthrow me. Thus, I am not in control: he dictates to me as much
as I dictate to him.
128
From his second perspective, Clausewitz saw war as always being
impacted by the dynamic tension between three components of varying
influence: the people, representing the natural forces of "violence,
enmity, and hatred;" the commander and his army, representing the "play
of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to
roam;" and the political aims of the government, representing the
"element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it
subject to reason alone."'' 29 In his view,
[t]he passions that are kindled in war must already be inherent in the
people; the scope which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in
the realm of probability and chance depends upon the particular
character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are
the business of the government alone. 130
Interestingly, Clausewitz likened these three components to "three
different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in
their relationship to one another," and he believed "[a] theory which
126. See CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 30, at 75. Clausewitz does address moral factors
generally in Book II, see id. at 115-31, and Book IIl, see id. at 216-18, but his
understanding of what he calls moral factors-'the skill of the commander, the
experience and courage of the troops, and their patriotic spirit,' id. at 218 (emphasis in
the original)-is not completely akin to a common understanding of these terms today.
127. Id. at 132-42.
128. See id. at 77.
129. Id. at 89. As to the emotion of the people, Clausewitz noted, "[e]ven the most
civilized of peoples, in short, can be fired with a passionate hatred for each other." See
id. at 76.
130. Id. at 89.
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ignores any of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between
them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason
alone it would be totally useless. 131
Finally, from his third perspective, Clausewitz focused on an aspect
he believed to be of vital importance: Politics. Clausewitz regarded a
decision by a state to go to war as a legitimate form of political discourse
for a nation-state, and a valid outcome of the state's political decision-
making process. 132  For Clausewitz, war was not just "a mere act of
policy but a true political instrument[.]' 133 In his view,
[i]t is of course, well known that the only source of war is politics-
the intercourse of governments and peoples, but it is apt to be
assumed that war suspends that intercourse and replaces it by a
wholly different condition, ruled by no law but its own. We
maintain, on the contrary, that war is simply a continuation of
political intercourse, with the addition of other means. We
deliberately use that phrase, 'with the addition of other means'
because we also want to make clear that war in itself does not
suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely
different.
As to any restraint in the use of force exercised by parties to a conflict,
Clausewitz saw this as having a functional grounding, rather than a legal
basis: Restraint among the more developed societies in not committing
atrocities against prisoners and civilians, for example, was the result of
having learned more effective ways to apply force "than the crude
expression of instinct." 135 Importantly, he saw these functionally based
restraints in the use of force as having arisen from the environment
created by the dynamic political relationships between nations.1
36
131. CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 30, at 89.
132. See id. at 579, 584.
133. Id. at 87.
134. Id. at 605.
135. Id. at 76.
136. CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 30, at 76. Later in On War, Clausewitz elaborated on
his views as to the development of restraints on the use of force during the
Enlightenment:
It ceased to be in harmony with the spirit of the times to plunder and lay waste
the enemy's land, which had played such an important role in antiquity, in
Tartar days and indeed in medieval times. It was rightly held to be
unnecessarily barbarous, an invitation to reprisals, and a practice that hurt the
enemy's subjects rather than their government-one therefore that was
ineffective and only served permanently to impede the advance of general
civilization.
Id. at 590-91. Cf The "Martens Clause," Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land (IV) pmbl., Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. 539; also cf
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 1, para. 2, June 8, 1977, 1125
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B. Reality of War
In contrast to his theoretical model of absolute war and his
perspective of war as a duel, Clausewitz noted that actual "[w]ar can be
of two kinds, in the sense that either the objective is to overthrow the
enemy-render him politically helpless or military impotent, thus forcing
him to sign whatever peace we please; or merely to occupy some of his
frontier-districts so we can annex them or use them for bargaining at the
peace negotiations." '137 Within this range, he noted that "wars can have
all degrees of importance and intensity, ranging from a war of
extermination down to a simple armed observation., 138 As Clausewitz
saw it, the more limited the objective of a war, the more likely politics
were at play in accomplishing that objective, 139 and the more that the
conflict was to seem political in nature. 140
In real war, Clausewitz noted that "[f]rom the enemy's character,
from his institutions, the state of his affairs and his general situation,
each side, using the laws of probability, forms an estimate of its
opponent's likely course and acts accordingly., 141 Although he believed
that the political object of the military operation was the most important
factor to be considered in both the theory and the reality of war, 142 he
identified two other factors which worked to keep real war from
approaching his theoretical extreme: "imperfect knowledge of the
situation" 143 and "friction., 144 Lack of accurate information about an
operational area, for example, led commanders to be cautious and
inefficient in the use and disposition of their forces as they sought to
provide against the different possibilities that could occur. 145 Clausewitz
defined "friction" as those elements present on every battlefield that
impeded the smooth operation of military forces, such as weather,
fatigue, and fear. 
146
Clausewitz's focus on the human element in war is another
commonality between his theories and EBAO. Because of the variable
U.N.T.S. 3, [hereinafter "AP I"] ("In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other
international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and
authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the
principles of humanity, and from the dictates of public conscience.").
137. CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 30, at 69 (emphasis in original).
138. Id. at 81.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 88.
141. Id. at 80 (emphasis in original).
142. CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 30, at 80-81.
143. Id. at 84.
144. Id. at 119.
145. Id. at 84-85.
146. See id. at 113, 115, 119-21.
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impacts of these factors upon operations, a commander could never
really be sure that he had properly allocated enough resources to the most
important point of the battlefield, or whether sufficient supplies could be
moved through mud or snow. 14 7  Importantly, Clausewitz noted the
feedback loop in which the results of military operations conducted
under these conditions influenced subsequent political decision-making
as to the continued use of force, and which tended therefore to further
restrain its use.1 48 In this sense, "friction" acts upon operations in much
the same way that undesired effects do in EBAO.
Clausewitz believed that the unpredictable disorder of real war
could be reduced, if not managed, through training and education.
Effective training required approaching war from two different aspects:
training and planning according to routine and procedures designed to
mitigate the impact of friction, lack of reliable information and the other
factors he identified, 49 and training that included these factors so that
commanders and soldiers could sharpen their judgment in dealing with
the inevitable chaos of the battlefield. 50 Clausewitz recognized that
[r]outines. . . represent a general way of executing tasks as they arise
based... on average probability. They represent the dominance of
principles and rules, carried through to actual application. As such,
they may have a place in the theory of the conduct of war, provided
they are not falsely represented as absolute, binding frameworks for
action (systems); rather, they are the best of the general forms, short
cuts, and options that may be substituted for individual decisions.'
5 1
He noted that the use of routines is "essential and inevitable when we
consider how often action is based on pure conjecture or takes place in
pure ignorance, either because the enemy prevents us from knowing all
the circumstances that might affect our dispositions, or because there is
not enough time.' 52  Clausewitz recognized that even at the lowest
levels of an army a feedback loop existed between even rote training and
the exercise of judgment in the heat of battle, noting that "[regulations
and drills] will steady [soldiers'] judgment, and also guard against
eccentric and mistaken schemes, which are the greatest menace in a field
where experience is so dearly bought."'' 53 At the same time, however,
147. See CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 30, at 113, 115, 119-21.
148. Id. at 87.
149. Id. at 153.
150. Id. at 122.
151. Id. at 153.
152. CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 30, at 153.
153. Id. at 153. Clausewitz also asserted that "[r]outine, apart from its sheer
inevitability, also contains one positive advantage. Constant practice leads to brisk,
precise and reliable leadership reducing natural friction and easing the working of the
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Clausewitz noted the importance of incorporating uncertainty into
training:
No general can accustom an army to war. Peacetime maneuvers are a
feeble substitute for the real thing; but even they can give an army an
advantage over others whose training is confined to routine,
mechanical drill. To plan maneuvers so that some of the elements of
friction are involved, which will train officers' judgment, common
sense and resolution is far more worthwhile than inexperienced
people might think.
154
It is also clear from the content of the book itself.155 On War is
several hundred pages long, and the bulk. of it deals not with theory, but
how war is and had been fought. Similarly, when Clausewitz suspended
his writing of On War in 1827, he focused on writing analytical historical
studies of campaigns in Italy in 1796 and 1799, and the final campaigns
of the Napoleonic era. 156  When published, these historical writings
amounted to over 1,500 printed pages, and made up four of the ten
volumes of his collected works.1
57
C. Summary-EBAO and Clausewitz's Views on War
Understanding Clausewitz's ideas on how to best deal with
uncertainty and friction in military operations is significant in assessing
their potential value in developing EBAO doctrine because it is not clear
that Clausewitz believed that a methodology like EBAO would actually
work. Following his observation that the lack of accurate intelligence
and time were two reasons why military action was so often based on
conjecture, he noted that "even if we did know all the circumstances,
their implications and complexities would not permit us to take the
necessary steps to deal with them. Therefore, our measures must always
be determined by a limited number of possibilities.' ' 158 Given a choice,
machine." Id. at 153 (emphasis in original). As recognized in the "Pre-Doctrinal
Handbook," this mechanical synchronization can have a positive effect upon the
mitigation of undesired effects, but it cannot eliminate them completely. See PRE-
DOCTRINAL HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at F5.
154. CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 30, at 122.
155. Clausewitz begins Chapter 6, Book II, of On War with the statement,
"[h]istorical examples clarify everything and also provide the best kind of proof in the
empirical sciences. This is especially true of the art of war." Id. at 199.
156. Peter Paret, An Unknown Letter By Clausewitz, 55 J. MIL. HIST. 143, 150 (1991);
Paret, supra note 106, at 27.
157. Paret, supra note 106, at 27.
158. CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 30, at 153. This practical simplification of a non-linear
problem through the use of linear measures is reflected in his concept of the "center of
gravity" as well. Clausewitz believed that any opponent has a dominant characteristic
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Clausewitz would have likely preferred a commander who, tempered by
education and experience, exercised sound judgment in the absence of
complete information rather than one who believed he had actually
achieved complete knowledge of the engagement space.1 59 In keeping
with the need for holistic EBAO doctrine, this critical perspective would
be useful in educating and training commanders and staffs to understand
the limitations of EBAO. Rather than revealing a stark dichotomy
between the conceptual nature of war and its actual practice, a review of
Clausewitz's theories instead shows an insightful appreciation of the way
in which each is the result of dynamic relationships of varying intensity
between the actors and the factors to be found in any military operation.
His appreciation of the non-linear nature of war, and his identification of
insufficient actionable information and friction as the impediments that
keep war from being tidy and predictable show the significant linkages
between his theories and EBAO. In Clausewitz's view, the conceptual
and actual natures of war are linked by the overwhelming importance in
each of politics-the source of war, the primary influence upon its
conduct, and the means by which it ends. Importantly, Clausewitz's
sober assessment of the role of politics in armed conflict foreshadows the
means by which law, in essence a political construct, began to become
truly relevant to military operations within 25 years after his death.
VI. On War and Law During Clausewitz's Lifetime
To be of full value today in the development of EBAO doctrine,
Clausewitz's ideas must be flexible enough to incorporate the modem
role of law in operations without becoming so distorted that they are not
really his theories anymore. The first step in examining his theories in
this manner, however, must be to determine whether Clausewitz's
assessment of the role of law was accurate at the time he was writing.
upon which its fighting effectiveness depends, and that identification of this factor was
important in devising strategy against the opponent. Beyerchen, supra note 23, at 84.
159. Clausewitz believed strongly in what he called "military genius," or the ability of
good commanders to make the right decisions at the right times despite the disorder of
the battlefield. CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 30, at 100. One of the qualities of military
genius was the possession of a "sensitive and discriminating judgment;" "a skilled
intelligence to scent out the truth." Clausewitz, supra note 30, at 101. Contemporary
research in the fields of behavioral finance and behavioral economics has tended to
confirm what modem commanders and staffs have recognized for quite some time-it is
risky to rely solely upon human intuition and personal experiences in making decisions in
complex environments. See Freud, Finance and Folly, ECONOMIST, Jan. 24, 2004, at 5-6.
Complementary, objective systems, such as EBAO, are also required, but as Dr.
Beyerchen notes, "in a profoundly unconfused way, [Clausewitz] understands that
seeking exact analytical solutions does not fit the nonlinear reality of the problems posed
by war, and hence our ability to predict the course and outcome of any given conflict is
severely limited." Beyerchen, supra note 23, at 61.
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Marked inconsistency between the law at the time he was writing and his
understanding of law would suggest that his theories are perhaps of
limited usefulness in developing EBAO doctrine, because he would have
failed to deal with what is now a very important aspect of military
operations, namely, international law.
A. Grotius, Montesquieu, and Vattel
In assessing Clausewitz's likely understanding of international law
at the time he was writing, it is important to remember that first and
foremost, it was the law of nations. Writing during the 30 Years War
(1618-1648), Hugo Grotius, one of the most influential writers on
international law, defined it as "that body of law ... which is concerned
with the mutual relationships among states or rulers of states, whether
derived from nature, or established by divine ordinances, or having its
origins in custom or tacit agreement" between such rulers. 160 Although
he did not address international law in detail, the work of the French
philosopher Charles de Montesquieu had a profound effect upon Western
legal and political thought during the Enlightenment, 16' and Clausewitz
acknowledged Montesquieu's influence in his writing of On War.
162
Montesquieu believed the basic principle of international law was "that
different nations ought in time of peace to do one another all the good
they can, and in time of war as little injury as possible, without
prejudicing their real interests." 163 With regard to war, victory was its
object, and the object of victory was conquest. In the end, the object of
conquest was simply self-preservation by the state.
164
Among the writers of the later Enlightenment, the writings of the
Swiss diplomat Emmerich de Vattel stand out as perhaps the most
optimistic in terms of the role of law in moderating the actions of the
state. 165 Vattel's Law of Nations Or the Principles of Natural Law had a
significant impact on legal thinking in France, Great Britain and the
United States, but its influence in Germany appears to have been
160. HUGO GROTius, De JuRE BELLI Ac PACIS LIBRE TRES (1625), reprinted in 2 THE
CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (James Brown Scott ed., Francis W. Kelly
trans., 1964).
161. Biographical Note, Charles de Montesquieu, 1689-1755, 35 GREAT BOOKS OF
THE WESTERN WORLD x (1993).
162. Clausewitz, supra note 30, at 19-20.
163. CHARLES DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS, reprinted in 35 GREAT BOOKS
OF THE WESTERN WORLD 3 (Mortimer J. Adler ed., Thomas Nugent trans., J.V. Prichard
rev. 1993).
164. Id.
165. Burrus M. Carnahan, Reason, Retaliation, and Rhetoric: Jefferson and the Quest
for Humanity in War, 139 MIL. L. REV. 83, 85 (1993).
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primarily in the field of diplomacy. 166 Given Clausewitz's internment in
France, his fluency in French, 167 and his (unrealized) desire to become a
diplomat, 168 it is likely that he was familiar with Vattel's work. Writing
over 125 years after Grotius, Vattel also defined international law as the
"law of sovereigns,"'' 69 with natural law as its primary source. 70 Vattel
further defined international law as "the science of the rights which exist
between nations or states, and of the obligations corresponding to those
rights." 17' Within such a system, the rights of a sovereign state were
paramount, and Vattel defined war as the prosecution of those rights by
force 72 in the event less coercive means failed to resolve an issue of
contention between states. 1
73
With regard to the law of war, however, Vattel's emphasis on the
humanitarian aspects of restricting the use of force marks a significant
departure from the work of Grotius. Grotius in large part derived
restrictions on the use of force from historical examples from antiquity,
paying particular attention to the practices and writings of the Romans
and ancient Greeks, as well as from the Bible. 174 While he sought to
ameliorate the effects of war on both combatants and noncombatants, he
did so primarily by identifying a baseline standard of humanitarian
conduct grounded on the practices of the past-which, admittedly, were
likely better than what he had observed during the 30 Years War.
175
Vattel, on the other hand, wrote during the Seven Years' War (1756-63),
a period of conflict marked by the use of limited warfare by relatively
small professional armies. 176 In keeping with the customs of his time,
Vattel took a much more expansive view of the protections afforded
prisoners of war, captured enemy civilians and property than Grotius.177
Importantly, though, Vattel's work deals pragmatically with the four
interrelated aspects of the law of armed conflict which have continued to
frustrate the law's application and observance even into recent times:
sovereignty, implementation, enforcement and the concept of military
166. ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 160-63
(1947).
167. PARET, supra note 21, at 19.
168. Id. at 325.
169. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL
LAW 12 (Charles D. Fenwick trans., 1964) (1758).
170. Id. at x.
171. Id. at 3.
172. Id. at 235.
173. See id. at 222-32.
174. GROTIUS, supra note 160, at 23-29.
175. Id. at 20.
176. LARRY D. ADDINGTON, THE PATTERNS OF WAR SINCE THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
2-7 (2d ed. 1994).
177. Albert de Lapradelle, Introduction to VATTEL, supra note 159, at xlviii-Iiii.
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necessity. With regard to sovereignty, Vattel believed that nations had
the primary responsibility to ensure their own preservation as
independent entities in the international community, and the right to do
as they wished so long as their actions were not detrimental to other
countries. 78  In Vattel's view, '[s]trength or weakness, in this case,
counts for nothing. A dwarf is as much a man as is a giant; a small
republic is no less a sovereign state than the most powerful Kingdom."'
179
Although sovereign states had no right to interfere in the government of
an independent state, 180 Vattel recognized that there were certain
instances when such action was allowable, such as providing relief in
response to natural disasters, 18' or intervening on behalf of an oppressed
people against a tyrannical ruler.182
Vattel recognized that reciprocity, whether in the positive sense of
shared interests in its application among the states,' 83 or in its negative
sense of reprisal for violations of international law, 18 4 was the only way
to implement and enforce the law of war. Enforcement of the law
through judicial procedures was unlikely, save perhaps when a nation's
military disciplinary code was violated.' 85 Although Prussian discipline
in this regard was legendary, 186 the restrictions on the use of force in
these codes against prisoners, civilians, and private property appear to
have been primarily based upon the need for a trained and disciplined
army rather than humanitarian concerns. 8 7 With regard to the concept of
military necessity, and in keeping with his appreciation of the limits of
enforcement, Vattel held that:
A lawful end confers a right only to those means which are necessary
to attain that right. Whatever is done in excess of such measures is
178. VATTEL, supra note 169, at 6-7.
179. Id. at 7.
180. Id. at 132.
181. Id. at 115.
182. Id. at 131.
183. See VATrEL, supra note 169, at 6-9.
184. See id. at 231-32.
185. Id. at 241. The trial of Peter von Hagenbach at Breisach in 1474 by a tribunal of
"representatives of the Hanseatic cities" for "having administered occupied territory in a
manner contrary to 'the laws of God and of man,"' and his subsequent execution was an
isolated exception to this rule. See L.C. Green, Enforcement of the Law in International
and Non-International Conflicts-The Way Ahead, 24 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 285,
291 (1996).
186. In an incident with which Clausewitz was possibly familiar, Prussian troops in
the Jena campaign in 1806 reportedly froze to death rather than burn nearby woodpiles of
uncertain ownership in their campfires. A. HILLARD ATTERIDGE, THE GERMAN ARMY IN
WAR 114 (1915).
187. CHARLES CLODE, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE UNDER MILITARY AND MARTIAL
LAW, As APPLICABLE To THE ARMY, NAVY, MARINES, AND AUXILIARY FORCES 74-75 (2d
ed. 1874).
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contrary to the natural law, and must be condemned as evil before the
tribunal of conscience. Hence it follows that certain acts of hostility
may be justifiable or not, according to the circumstances. 88
Vattel appears to reinforce this idea with a list of proscribed practices,
including killing prisoners of war, maltreating civilians and using poison
in assassination, 189 but upon closer examination it becomes obvious that
many of the proscriptions are themselves qualified. For example, Vattel
states that "[a]s soon as an enemy submits and hands over his arms we no
longer have the right to take away his life."' 190 However, he notes that "a
prince, or his general, is justified in sacrificing the lives of his enemies to
his own safety and that of his people," and that on this basis reprisal
against prisoners of war would be allowed if one's own soldiers were
maltreated by their captors. 191 Further, captors who could not adequately
feed or guard prisoners of war could put them to death so long as "no
promise has been made to spare their lives" and "the captor is very
certain that his safety demands the sacrifice."' 92  Similarly, although
enemy civilians were ordinarily protected from death and maltreatment
under contemporary European military practice, they could still be held
hostage in order to coerce their ruler to yield.' 93
B. Hegel
In general, the law of armed conflict developed little during the
wars and social upheaval of the Napoleonic Age. 194 Further, by the end
of the 18 th century, influential German philosophers and writers had
begun to question the basic worldview of the Enlightenment and its
natural law tradition.195 Perhaps the most prominent of these Counter-
Enlightenment, or German Movement, thinkers was Georg Hegel. 96 On
the subject of international law, Hegel's writings reflect a positivist
approach as compared to the natural law approach of Vattel. Not
surprisingly, given the conservative political reaction and retrenchment
that followed the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the primacy of the
principles of sovereignty and survival of the nation remained
188. VATrEL, supra note 169, at 279.
189. Id. at 287.
190. Id. at 280.
191. Id. at 280-81.
192. Id. at 285.
193. VATTEL, supra note 169, at 283.
194. See L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW-A TREATISE 226 (H. Lauterpacht ed.,
7th ed. 1952).
195. AZAR GAT, THE ORIGINS OF MILITARY THOUGHT: FROM THE ENLIGHTENMENT TO
CLAUSEWITZ 142 (1989).
196. Id. at 232-33.
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undiminished in Hegel's views of international law. Hegel lectured at
the University of Berlin from 1818 until his death in 1831,197 the same
period of time that Clausewitz was Director of the Prussian War College.
It is possible that the two men met, 198 and given Hegel's reputation as a
lecturer and writer, it is a reasonable assumption that Clausewitz was
familiar with Hegel's ideas and writings. 199 In his Philosophy of Right,
published in 1821, Hegel defined international law as springing from
"the relations between autonomous states." 200 Accordingly, "that which
is absolute in it retains the form of an ought-to-be, since its actuality
depends on different wills each of which is sovereign., 20 1 Hegel saw the
notion that treaties ought to be kept as being of fundamental importance
in international law, but he realized that as sovereign entities, nations
made and broke treaties regularly. 0 2 In Hegel's view, therefore, the
primary rule governing the relations between states was self-interest, and
in actual practice "what really happens is that international relations in
accordance with treaties alternate with the severance of these
relations."0 3
C. Summary-Clausewitz's Understanding of Law
Clauswitz likely knew the more significant writings on international
law, as briefly reviewed above, when he wrote On War. This familiarity
suggests that he was aware that international law was, as in Hegel's
words, essentially regarded as an "ought-to-be." Sovereignty, and the
imperative to maintain sovereignty, would in the end determine the
course of action to be taken in a given situation, and not the parts of
international law relevant to the conduct of war. Although Vattel's
emphasis on natural law tends to obscure this reality, his highly qualified
197. T.M. Knox, Biographical Note to GEORG W.F. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF
RIGHT vi (T.M. Knox trans., 1952).
198. At the very least, they had a mutual social acquaintance: Karl von Meusebach.
PARET, supra note 21, at 316.
199. Lenin believed that Clausewitz's ideas "were fertilized by Hegel." Azar Gat,
Clausewitz and the Marxists: Yet Another Look, 27 J. CONTEMP. HIST. 363, 376 (1992).
Clausewitz's method of dialectical analysis is often described as Hegelian, but Paret
points out that this form of analysis was commonly used among the Prussian social class
to which Clausewitz belonged. PARET, supra note 21, at 149-51. Further, Gat notes that
Clausewitz had already demonstrated "Hegelian" thinking in his writings prior to the time
that Hegel became well known. GAT, supra note 195, at 233.
200. HEGEL, supra note 197, at 212.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 213.
203. Id. at 109. Perhaps reflecting more of Vattel's approach, the U.S. Constitution
made international treaties entered into by the U.S. part of the supreme law of the nation.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. See also Carnahan, supra note 165, at 84 n.4 (concerning the
reception of Vattel's work in early American legal thinking).
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list of forbidden practices shows he could not ignore its determinative
impact. From a positivist viewpoint, "international law" was not really
"law" at all, because it was not a "command or rule imposed by a
determinate sovereign to a subject or subjects, and enforceable by a
determinate sanction in the case of non-compliance. 2 °4 As Hegel noted,
"[t]here is no Praetor to judge between states; at best there may be an
arbitrator or a mediator, and even he exercises his functions contingently
only, i.e., in the dependence of the particular wills of the disputants. 2 °5
Finally, and perhaps fatally, the law of armed conflict at the time carried
within it the exception that could trump the application of all its
mitigating principles as states struggled with each other as each sought to
maintain its sovereignty: the complete justification of military necessity.
As a matter of theory, Clausewitz's conception of "law" appears to
reflect the positivism of Hegel:
Law is the broadest concept applicable to both perception and action.
In its literal sense the term obviously contains a subjective, arbitrary
element, and yet it expresses the very thing on which man and his
environment essentially depend. Viewed as a matter of cognition,
law is the relationship between things and their effects. Viewed as a
matter of the will, law is a determinant of action; at that point it is
synonymous with decree and prohibition.
20 6
The consistency of Clausewitz's understanding of international law with
the state of law as it existed at the time of his writing of On War is
perhaps best shown in an anonymous letter he wrote to a German
newspaper in 1831 defending "unofficial" support given to Russia by
nominally neutral Prussia during the Polish Uprising that had begun in
1830.207 In it, he refuted allegations by a senior Polish military official
that Prussia was supplying Russia with food and materiel, and that
Prussian military personnel were serving with Russian units.
Responding that only private Prussian merchants had made sales to the
Russians, Clausewitz stated,
One must be very ignorant in the history of international law to find a
breach of neutrality in such actions, if indeed it is possible to apply
the concept of neutrality to an insurgent power that is not recognized
by a single government in the world. [ ] If such traffic were to be in
the nature of an intervention, how would one have to characterize the
active help by means of money, arms and volunteers that other
204. THOMAS ALFRED WALKER, A MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (1895).
205. HEGEL, supra note 197, at 213.
206. CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 30, at 151 (emphasis in the original).
207. PARET, supra note 21, at 418.
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countries have tolerated in order to give a boost to the Belgian and
Polish rebellions?
208
On its face, Clausewitz's reply sounds quite lawyerly. The Polish rebels
had no standing under international law to claim they were being
prejudiced by a Prussian violation of neutrality, and regardless, the
support being given was not official, but rather bought by Russia from
private Prussian vendors and not the neutral Prussian state. The last
sentence in this passage is the most telling, however, for Clausewitz is
specifically referring to the decisions of other European powers to ignore
the assistance the French were providing to both the Polish and Belgian
rebels in apparent contravention of the law of neutrality. 20 9 As historian
Peter Paret notes, Clausewitz's implication is clear: "if states were
sufficiently powerful, or otherwise favored by circumstance, the laws of
neutrality could be bent with impunity, in the 19th century as well as
earlier times., 210 For Clausewitz then, international law was not so much
"law" as it was a policy tool, and a tool of limited utility at best.
Clausewitz's assessment of the impact of law upon the conduct of armed
conflict at the time he was writing may have been blunt, but it was not
inaccurate.
VII. The Role of Law in Contemporary Military Operations
If Clausewitz's views on the role of law in military operations are
consistent with the state of the law at the time he was writing, then the
last test they must pass to be of value in developing NATO EBAO
doctrine is whether they can accommodate the contemporary role of law
in military operations without losing their conceptual integrity.
International law and national law relevant to the conduct of military
operations has changed significantly in the last 150 years. Importantly,
these changes resulted first from the political decisions of nations'
governments to affirmatively bind themselves by lasting treaties to
restrict the circumstances under which military force can be used.211
Secondly, as this body of treaty law grew, nations also began to see
themselves as being bound by the customary international law that
208. Id. at 419 (quoting STAATS UND GELEHRTE ZEITUNG DES HAMBURGISCHEN
UNPARTEIISCHEN CORRESPONDANTEN (Hamburg), July 26, 1831, at 3).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See, e.g, Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV), Vienna, Oct. 13,
1995, 35 I.L.M. 1218 [hereinafter Blinding Laser]; Declaration Renouncing the Use, in
Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, Saint Petersburg,
Nov. 29 and Dec. 11, 1868, A.T.S. 125 (reflecting over 125 years of specific treaties of
this nature).
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developed as a result of state acceptance and practice in this area. 212
Third, as nations have grouped themselves in multinational organizations
like the U.N. and the European Union, they have often committed
213themselves to new laws in this area. Finally, the lobbying efforts of
international organizations and private international groups concerned
with the use of force have resonated with the governments of the world's
nations, and have resulted in important treaties like the Ottawa
Convention banning landmines,214 and the Statute of Rome establishing
the International Criminal Court.2 '5 All of these developments have had
a significant effect upon the four factors mentioned above that
traditionally kept international law from being more like "law":
sovereignty, implementation, enforcement and the concept of military
necessity. To assess the conceptual integrity of Clausewitz's theories in
light of these developments, it is useful to first briefly review how the
law relating to these four factors developed.
A. Sovereignty
During the last 150 years, the nations of the world have increasingly
limited their sovereign rights regarding the use of military force both in
the context of determining whether to use force and the actual use of
force once the decision to engage in armed conflict is made. As to the
issue of nations deciding to use military force in their relations with one
another, the brutal experiences of World War I resulted in a number of
212. See Jianming Shen, The Relativity and Historical Perspective of the Golden Age
of International Law, 6 INT'L LEGAL THEORY 15, 20-27 (2000); see generally JEAN-
MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DosWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW, VOLUME I: RULES (2005).
213. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31
[hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316,, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convetion III]; Geneva Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War Aug. 12, 1049, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]; European Convention on Human
Rights, Rome, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. 5.
214. Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Sep. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S.
241. See E-Mine Electronic Mine Information, International Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Treaty, http://mineaction.org/overview.asp?o=1116 (last visited Sept. 16, 2007)
(describing the International Campaign to Ban Landmines).
215. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, para. l(a)-(c), July
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90; see also Amnesty International, Introduction to the NGO
Coalition for an International Criminal Court (CICC), http://www.amnesty.org/
en/library/asset/IOR40/018/2000/en/dom-IOR400182000en.pdf (last visited Sep. 16,
2007).
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initiatives to try to prevent war from happening again on such a
destructive scale.216 Perhaps the most notable of these efforts from a
legal perspective, irrespective of their actual efficacy, were the Kellogg-
Briand Pact of 1928 and the League of Nations. In the Kellogg-Briand
Pact, the signatory nations all agreed to renounce war as a means to settle
disputes amongst themselves.217 In hindsight, the notion that war would
be outlawed at the stroke of a pen seems naive, but the treaty did form
the basis for the charges of waging illegal aggressive war against the
major German war criminals at the International Military Tribunal at
Niirnberg after World War 11.218 As such, even though the treaty did not
stop war itself, its impact has at the very least become part of non-treaty,
or customary, international law.
In the same spirit of preventing another horrific international armed
conflict as World War I, the League of Nations was created to provide,
among other things, a mechanism for the peaceful settlement of disputes
among members. 219 Among its powers, it could use measures such as
economic sanctions to compel a return to peaceful behavior by nations
acting aggressively towards another nation. 220  The League of Nations
was hobbled from the beginning by the failure of the United States to
join, and therefore crumbled fairly quickly in the face of Italian, German
and Japanese intransigence regarding their expansionist policies in the
1930s. 22 1 The example of the League of Nations, however, did provide
the model for a more lasting, although imperfect, international congress
of nations, the United Nations. The signatories to the U.N. Charter agree
216. See, e.g., Anti-War Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation, Rio de Janeiro,
Oct. 10, 1933, 49 Stat. 3363 (1935-36), T.S. 906; Treaty Agreeing to a Limitation of
Naval Armament, Feb. 6, 1922, 43 Stat. 1655, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (the Washington
Treaty). In addition, other peace movement organizations include the National Council
for the Prevention of War, see FREDERICK J. LIBBY, To END WAR: THE STORY OF THE
NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR THE PREVENTION OF WAR (1969), and the Women's International
League for Freedom and Peace ("WILPF"). Founded in 1915, WILPF has had
consultative status with the UN since 1948. See The WILPF-United States,
http://www.wilpf.org/US-WILPF (last visited Aug. 30, 2008).
217. Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy art. 1, Aug. 27, 1928,
46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
218. The Avalon Project, Yale Law School, Judgment: Violations of International
Treaties, 30 Sept. and 1 Oct., 1946, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/
imt/proc/judviol.htm (last visited Aug 20, 2008) (Judgment of the International Military
Tribunal for the Trial of German War Criminals explaining that defendants violated
international treaties).
219. League of Nations Covenant, arts. 10-15.
220. Id. art. 16.
221. See Klinton W. Alexander, Ignoring the Lessons of the Past: The Crisis In
Darfur And the Case For Humanitarian Intervention, 15 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 6
(2005); Byard Q. Clemmons & Gary D. Brown, Rethinking International Self-Defense:
The United Nations'Emerging Role, 45 NAVAL L. REV. 217, 232-33 (1998).
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to abide by restrictions on their sovereignty regarding the use of force.222
U.N. members agree to settle their disputes by peaceful means,223 and to
"refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or
in any manner inconsistent with the purposes" of the U.N.2 24 The U.N.
Security Council has the "primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security, '225 and may impose economic
sanctions226 or even call upon member states to provide forces for
military operations as necessary.227 The U.N. Charter also provides for
regional organizations to assist in keeping the peace,228 including the use
of enforcement action as needed.229  For members of the U.N.,
aggression by one state against another is now no longer a continuation
of politics by other means, it is illegal.23° In practice, of course, the
situation is more complicated. The U.N. Charter also recognizes that
nations retain the inherent right of individual and collective self-
defense.231 Some scholars believe that Article 51 only allows the use of
force in self-defense when there has been an actual attack.232 Others
believe that the Article 51 right of self-defense includes the customary
law principle of anticipatory self-defense, which would allow force to be
used to repel imminent armed attacks.233
As to the actual use of force in a conflict, nations have increasingly
bound themselves by treaties that restrict the means by which force may
be applied.234 Many of these treaties, starting with the Paris Declaration
Respecting Maritime Law of 1856, which abolished privateering,
235
222. See U.N. Charter, art. 2(3).
223. Id.
224. Id. art. 2(4). These principles were amplified in the U.N. Declaration on
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among
States, Gen. Ass. Res. 2625 (XXV), Oct. 24, 1970.
225. U.N. Charter, art. 24(1).
226. Id. art. 41.
227. Id. art. 42.
228. Id. art. 52.
229. Id. art. 53.
230. U.N. Charter, art. 2(4); THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED
CONFLICTS 31 (D. Fleck ed., 1995).
231. U.N. Charter, art. 51.
232. Leo van den Hole, Anticipatory Self-Defence Under International Law, 19 AM.
U. INT'L L. REV. 69, 80-81 (2003).
233. THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S LAW CENTER AND SCHOOL, OPERATIONAL
LAW HANDBOOK, JA 422, 4-5 (2006). The classic formulation of this position is the
Caroline Doctrine. See Caroline Incident, 2 MOORE DIG. INT'L L. 412 (1906); Letter
from Mr. Webster to Mr. Fox (Apr. 24, 1841), in 29 BRIT. AND FOREIGN ST. PAPERS 1129,
1138 (1857).
234. See generally, Blinding Laser, supra note 211.
235. Declaration of Paris, Apr. 16 1856, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 89 (Supp. 1907), available
at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diana/undocs/war-03.htm.
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address the use of particular means of warfare. Other treaties, such as
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, have strengthened the protections given
prisoners of war and other non-combatants, and have set out in detail the
specific rights afforded and the processes to be followed in handling
these groups of people.236 Importantly, the enactment of Common
Article Three to each of the conventions requires the basic humanitarian
treatment of individuals effectively out of combat even in situations not
involving international armed conflict.237 Further, treaties have also
codified the principles to be applied by those using force against enemy
targets, such that force may only be used against military targets so long
as the anticipated military advantage to be gained is not outweighed by
excessive incidental injury and damage to protected civilians and
23property.  Finally, as the body of treaty law has grown, and a pattern of
state practice in conformance with the treaties has developed, nations
have recognized the binding effect of customary international law on the
use of force in military operations.239
The horrors of World War II also led to the development of a body
of law that is playing an increasing role in modern military operations:
human rights law. 240 Beginning with the Convention for the Prevention
and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of December 9, 1948,241
nations have also started restricting their sovereignty with regard to their
treatment of their own populations. When coupled with binding
domestic legislation and effective enforcement mechanisms, human
rights laws which would ordinarily only be enforceable within a nation's
236. 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 213. See also AP I, supra note 136. In
many respects AP I merged the law with respect to means and methods of warfare with
the law applicable to victims of armed conflict.
237. JEAN PICTET, DEVELOPMENT AND THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW, 32 (1967).
238. See, e.g., AP I, supra note 136, art. 51(5).
239. See Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Law: A
Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 87
INT'L REV. RED CROSS 175, 187 (2005) (stating that the vast majority of the 1949 Geneva
Convention provisions, including common article 3, are now considered part of
customary international law); see also Prosecutor v. Tadic, case no. IT-94-1-AR72,
Appeal on Jurisdiction (Oct. 2, 1995), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32, 67 (1996) (the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia held that, although "the
detailed regulations of international armed conflict" are inapplicable to cases of armed
conflict, the customary rules of the law of war are applicable under customary
international law.").
240. Importantly, international organizations that have military components have
chosen to require the military forces operating under their command to follow this body
of law when engaged in operations. The Secretary-General, Observance by United
Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law, SECRETARY-GENERAL'S BULLETIN,
ST/SGB/1999/13 (Aug. 6, 1999), available at http://www.un.org/peace/st-sgb-
1999_13.pdf.
241. 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
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territorial boundaries may in fact now be applicable to that nation's
military operations in foreign countries. An example of this is a case
brought by families of Iraqi individuals detained by British forces in
Iraq.242 The British House of Lords has held that the European Charter
of Human Rights may be applicable in territory effectively occupied by
British forces, and therefore an independent investigation into the
injuries suffered by a detainee who died while in British custody must be
undertaken.243 As a matter of policy, many nations will choose to apply
the law of armed conflict (even if not required legally) 244 and promote
human rights law in military operations,245 further blurring the line
between these two related bodies of law, and increasing the impact of
law on military operations.
B. Implementation
The conclusion of treaties restricting the use of military operations,
or the use of force in military operations, may have little meaningful
effect in the actual conduct of operations until commanders and forces
can be effectively trained to understand them and apply them practically.
The 1949 Geneva Conventions recognize this problem, as does the later
Additional Protocol I to the conventions, and therefore require
signatories to train their personnel on the requirements of the law of
armed conflict, and to have legal advisors made available to commanders
and staffs to assist them in proper decision making.246 Today, many
242. Richard Norton-Taylor, UK Admits Breaching Human Rights Convention Over
Detainee's Death, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 28, 2008, available at http://www.guardian.
co.uk/world/2008/mar/28/humanrights.military.
243. Matthew Weaver, Human Rights Law Applies in Iraq Killing, Lords Rule,
GUARDIAN.CO.UK., June 13, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/iraq/story/
0,,2101835,00.html; see also Farah Stockman, Justices Open US Courts to Detainees,
BOSTON GLOBE, June 13, 2008, at Al.
244. See, e.g., CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION 5810.01B,
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM (Mar. 25, 2002) ("Unless directed
otherwise by competent authorities, [U.S. forces] will apply law of war principles during
all operations that are categorized as Military Operations Other Than War."); Major
Timothy P. Bulman, A Dangerous Guessing Game Disguised As Enlightened Policy:
United States Law Of War Obligations During Military Operations Other Than War, 159
MIL. L. REv. 152, 164 (1999) (translating Humantares Volkrecht In Bewaffneten
Konflicten Handbuch, para. 211, DSK AV207320065 (Aug. 1992)).
245. See, e.g., The New Zealand Government's Defence Policy Framework-June
2000 11, 18, http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/downloads/pdf/public-docs/
defencepolicyframeworkjune2000.pdf (last visited Sep. 16, 2007) (discussing New
Zealand's foreign policy that is committed to the maintenance of human rights, and how
New Zealand forces will neither exercise nor cooperate "with the armed forces of states
which sanction the use of their armed forces to suppress human rights").
246. Geneva Convention III, supra note 213, art. 127. See also Geneva Convention I,
supra note 213, art. 47; Geneva Convention II, supra note 213, art. 48; Geneva
Convention IV, supra note 213, art. 144; AP I, supra note 136, arts. 82, 87.
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nations have developed sophisticated programs of instruction for their
personnel.
Recognizing that the pertinent knowledge of the law of armed
conflict will vary depending on a particular soldier's level of command
responsibility and occupational specialty, these programs often provide
basic education and training for everyone, and subsequent education and
training at higher levels as soldiers progress in their military careers.247
Importantly, nations have recognized that with the stresses of armed
conflict, even thorough academic instruction in the law of armed conflict
is insufficient to imbue soldiers with the necessary knowledge to ensure
correct application in the field.248 Many nations have developed complex
and realistic situational training programs for soldiers that challenge
them to apply what they have learned about the law of armed conflict in
simulations involving living role players.249  Importantly, given the
complexity of modem military organizations, these sorts of exercises are
not only used with the soldiers who will actually interact with civilians
and potential adversaries on the ground, but with operational level
commanders and staffs in computer and role player assisted headquarters
exercises as well.250 The rules of engagement (ROE) play an integral
part of any training exercise as they can be tailored to any command
level.251 NATO ROE are defined as the "directives to military forces
(including individuals) that define the circumstances, conditions, degree,
and manner in which force, or actions which might be construed as
provocative, may be applied." 252 In many armed forces ROE serve as the
principle mechanism to ensure that the forces comply with the
requirements of domestic and international law.253
247. Jody M. Prescott, Training in the Law ofArmed Conflict-A NA TO Perspective,
7 J. MIL. ETHICS 66, 68-71 (2008).
248. Id. at 71-72.
249. See, e.g., DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-0, OPERATIONS paras. 6-29, 9-16
(June 2001). See also David Axe, Iraq Training, Hollywood Style, LEATHERNECK MAG.,
Nov. 2006, at 24, 27; Larry Lane, Role Playing for Bosnia, SOLDIERS, Mar. 1998, at 20,
21.
250. See Bernhard Koffel & Philipp Heger, NATO-PfP Exercises "Cooperative
Longbow and Lancer 2006," TRUPPENDIENST, Ausgabe 1, 2007, at 295 available at
http://www.bmlv.gv.at/truppendiesnst/ausgaben/artikel.php?=554; Are Rannem
Johansen, The Final Exam, Joint Warfare Centre Media Center, June 17, 2004,
http://www.jwc.nato.int/article.php?articlelD=37.
251. Mark S. Martins, Deadly Force is Authorized, But Also Trained, 25 ARMY LAW.
1, 2-4 (2001); OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 233, at 92-93.
252. NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, MILITARY COMMITTEE, MC 362/1,
NATO RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 2 (2003).
253. Richard J. Grunawalt, The JCS Standing Rules of Engagement: A Judge
Advocate's Primer, 42 A.F. L. REV. 245, 246-47 (1997).
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C. Enforcement
Rather than relying upon reciprocity as the primary basis for use of
international law in a conflict, or in its breach, reprisal,254 treaty
provisions can affirmatively require states to repress violations of the
Law of Armed Conflict, to cooperate with UN actions to investigate
violations, and to pay compensation when appropriate.255 Perhaps most
importantly, however, within the last 15 years, formal judicial
mechanisms have begun to provide increasingly effective means of
enforcement. 256  Beginning with the creation of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993,257 a
number of international courts have been established to try violations of
the law of armed conflict and human rights law that occurred in specific
countries, including Rwanda, 258 Sierra Leone259 and Cambodia.260 As of
2006, the ICTY had tried 94 of 161 individuals accused of international
crimes in the Yugoslavian conflicts. 261 The ICTY moved quickly to
assert its jurisdiction over alleged war crimes resulting from the conflict
254. Reprisal, always of questionable efficacy, is no longer seen as valid option to
make an opponent comply with international law. See AP I, supra note 136, arts. 51(6),
52(1), 53(c), 54(4), 55(2), and 56(4); see also Derek Bowett, Reprisals Involving
Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1972).
255. See, e.g., AP I, supra note 136, arts. 85-91.
256. The International Court of Justice (the successor to the Permanent Court of
International Justice created in 1922 under League of Nations auspices), established in
1945 as part of the U.N., has only limited jurisdiction over issues involving armed
conflict. Introduction to DOCUMENTS ON THE LAW OF WAR 33 (Adam Roberts &
Richard Guelffeds., 1982).
257. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, S.C. Res. 827 U.N. Doc. S/RES/508 (May 25, 1993),
available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/basic/statut/S-RES-827_93.htm.
258. Adam Roberts, The Law of War: Problems of Implementation In Contemporary
Conflicts, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 11, 72 (1995).
259. Agreement for and Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, S.C. Res. 508,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1400 (Mar. 28, 2002) available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/
UJNDOC/GEN/N02/309/07/PDF/N0230907.pdf.
260. Agreement between The United Nations and the Royal Government of
Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed
During The Period Of Democratic Kampuchea, G.A. Res.57/228, U.N. Doc.
AIRES/57/228 (Feb. 27, 2003) available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/N02/554/25/PDF/N0255425.pdf.
261. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Thirteenth Annual
Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Republic of Yugoslavia since 1991, G.A. Res. 61/271, U.N. Doc A/RES/61/271
(Aug. 21, 2006), available at http://www.un.org/icty/rappanu-e/2006/AR06.pdf. When
appropriate, the ICTY will cede jurisdiction back to national courts to try alleged war
criminals. See, e.g., Croat General Jailed for War Crimes, CNN.com-Europe, May 30,
2008, http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/05/30/croat.war.ap/index.html.
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in Kosovo in 1999, and in fact subjected the NATO operation in that
conflict to a degree of scrutiny.262 Although it is still relatively in its
infancy, the world's first standing war and human rights crime tribunal,
the International Criminal Court, has begun the process of holding its
first trials against perpetrators of alleged war crimes and crimes against
humanity from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, and
Uganda.263
The history of national courts trying alleged war criminals and
human rights violators, particularly after major conflicts, has been
uneven. 264 After World War I, the victorious Allies were spectacularly
ineffective in their efforts to have alleged German and Turkish war
criminals tried by either their own courts or German and Turkish
26526courts. War crimes trials in the Balkans fared no better.266 World War
II ended with the Allies fully occupying Germany and Japan; in addition
to the Niirnberg and Tokyo international tribunals, there were numerous
national military and civilian trials of alleged war criminals. 67
Regardless, political considerations impacted the administration of post-
war justice, and led to many controversial trials, such as the French trials
of German and Alsatian soldiers belonging to the 2 nd SS Panzer (Das
268Reich) Division. Despite the intensity and brutality of many of the
Cold War era conflicts, there were relatively few trials for acts that were
war crimes per se or criminal acts that likely constituted war crimes but
were tried in ordinary courts-martial. 269 Today, however, the military
262. See Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to review the
NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, June 13, 2000,
39 I.L.M. 1257.
263. International Criminal Court, Situations and Cases, http://www.icc-cpi.int/
cases.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2007).
264. See, e.g., Croat General Jailed for War Crimes, supra note 247 (discussing two
retired commanders tried for alleged war crimes during the Croatian-Serbian conflict of
1991-95, one of which was convicted but the other was acquitted because "though he was
formally commander, his real uthority had been reduced at the time").
265. JAMES WILLIS, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG 132-40, 154-62 (1982).
266. Id. at 153.
267. See PHILLIP R. PICCIGALLO, THE JAPANESE ON TRIAL 14 (1979); Maximillian
Koessler, American War Crimes Trials in Europe, 39 GEO. L.J. 18 (1950).
268. See MAx HASTINGS, DAS REICH: THE MARCH OF THE 2ND PANZER DIVISION
THROUGH FRANCE 230 (1981); Massacre in French Village; Former S.S. Men on Trial,
THE TIMES (London), Jan. 13, 1953, at 5.
269. Of the 91,000 Pakistani military personnel captured by Indian and Bangladeshi
forces in the Bangladeshi War of Independence, 195 were specifically identified as
alleged war criminals. In the political settlement after the war, all Pakistani prisoners
were repatriated without any commitment that Pakistan would prosecute any alleged war
crimes. Jordan J. Paust & Albert P. Blaustein, War Crimes Jurisdiction and Due
Process: The Bangladesh Experience, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 2-35 (1978). No
war crimes trials appear to have been held as a result of the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988,
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justice systems of nations involved in the Iraqi and Afghani conflicts are
significantly engaged in trying instances of alleged soldier misconduct.270
Further, in the exercise of universal jurisdiction over certain kinds of
offenses, the ordinary criminal courts of many countries now have the
authority to try cases such as alleged war crimes that may have occurred
thousands of miles outside their ordinary criminal jurisdictions.27'
A discussion of enforcement cannot ignore the role played by
various international and non-governmental organizations that closely
follow the use of force in military operations, and who publicize what
they see as potential violations of the law of armed conflict and human
rights law in the media.272 The media's impact has been boosted by
modem communications technology, and in a non-linear fashion, it
shapes public opinion and political positions at a speed unimaginable in
Clausewitz's day. 73 As Major General Lewis MacKenzie, a former U.N.
Protection Force commander in Sarajevo, noted regarding his own use of
EBAO:
Wherever the media goes, a lot of serious violations of human rights
either move away or stop. The media was the only major weapon
system I had. Whenever I went into negotiations with warring
parties, it was a tremendous weapon to be able to say: "Okay, if you
don't want to do it the UN's way, I'll nail your butt on CNN in about
20 minutes." It worked, nine times out of ten.
274
and few from the Gulf War of 1990-1991. See Roberts, supra note 204, at 46, 51. The
trials of three U.S. soldiers for the massacre of civilians at My Lai in Viet Nam, for
example, were tried as violations of the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice, not war
crimes per se. See United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19 (1973).
270. See, e.g., Jamie Doward and Mark Townsend, Army Faces New Claims Over
Iraq Brutality, THE OBSERVER, Jan. 23, 2005, at 1 available at http://www.guardian.
co.uk/uk/2005/jan/23/military.iraq; Laura Parker, Court-Martial Begins for Abu Ghraib
Figure, USA TODAY, Jan. 6, 2005, at 3A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/
news/world/iraq/2005-01-05-graner-court-martialx.htm.
271. See Lisa Abend & Geoff Pingree, Spain Opens Case Against US Soldiers,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 25, 2007, at 7, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/
2007/0125/p07s02-woeu.html (case brought by family of Spanish journalist killed by
U.S. forces during fighting in Baghdad); Brandon Smith, Germany Rejects Rumsfeld War
Crimes Probe, JURIST.COM, Feb. 10, 2005, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/
2005/02/germany-rejects_rumsfeld war crimes.php (action sought in German court
against U.S. Secretary of Defense by attorneys for Abu Ghraib prisoners).
272. See LARRY MINEAR ET AL., THE NEWS MEDIA, CIVIL WAR AND HUMANITARIAN
ACTION (1996); see also Landmine Monitor, http://www.icbl.org/lm (cooperative and
systematic efforts of non-governmental organizations to monitor implementation of
Ottawa Convention) (last visited Sep. 16, 2007).
273. See, e.g., Donald H. Rumsfeld, Sec. of Defense, Addresss to Council on Foreign
Relations (Feb. 17, 2006), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/search/ (search in
speeches database for "Rumsfeld" and "Harold Pratt House").
274. Minear, supra note 272, at 59.
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D. Military Necessity
Finally, one of the most important changes in the law of armed
conflict since Clausewitz's time has been in the definition of "military
necessity." Prior to World War II, there was a difference in opinion
between British and U.S. jurists and their German counterparts.275 The
prevailing Anglo-American view was that military necessity "should be
limited to those circumstances in which the law has in advance given an
express sanction for its use. 2 76  Some German writers, however,
believed that military necessity allowed violation of the laws of armed
conflict when "the ultimate safety of the state" was at issue.2 77 During
World War II, the primacy of the concept of state preservation over
compliance with the law of war was consistent with the National-
Socialist dogma of the Third Reich that glorified the survival of the
Aryan race as an end to be achieved regardless of the means. 278 Defense
counsel at the International Military Tribunal at Ndirnberg argued that the
need for self-preservation was a defense to charges of war crimes,279 and
the issue was not truly settled until the subsequent trials of lower ranking
German officials.2 80  As understood currently, military necessity
authorizes the use of only that force which is actually necessary to
complete a mission. Such force may include only "those measures not
forbidden by international law which are indispensable for securing the
complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible.281
E. Summary-Clausewitz's Theories and the Modern Role of Law
The role of law in contemporary military operations is very different
from the role it played when Clausewitz was writing. International law
is no longer merely an imperceptible limitation upon a government's
policy decisions regarding the use of force.282 Although it is still
275. The 1902 manual used by the German Army, Kriegsbrauch im Landkrieg,
reflected the view of General von Moltke that application of the law of war depended on
the circumstances, and was therefore a matter of discretion. See MANFRED LACHS, WAR
CRIMES 11 (1945).
276. BURLEIGH C. RODICK, THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 59
(1928).
277. Id. at 59-60.
278. See Handel, supra note 19, at 233, 256.
279. TELFORD TAYLOR, ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 487 (1992).
280. The Hostage Case (United States v. List), XI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 1252-
54 (1948); William O'Brien, The Meaning of Necessity in International Law, I Y.B. OF
WORLD POLITY 109 (1957).
281. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE,
CHANGE 1 3 (1956).
282. See After Smart Weapons, Smart Soldiers, supra note 1 (discussing senior
military leader who recognizes impact of law, or at least lawyers, on operations); see also
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evolving, international law has become much more law-like even in a
positivist sense that would register in Clausewitz's understanding of
international law.283 There are important areas in which governments
and commanders retain significant discretion whether to engage in armed
conflict, such as in self-defense, or the amount of force to be used against
a target, as found in the proportionality analysis under the Law of Armed
Conflict.284 However, there are very important, unalterable restrictions
on the use of force, such as the definition of military necessity. As an
exercise of national sovereignty, in giving effect to their own political
decision-making processes, the vast majority of the world's nations have
subscribed to these restrictions.285 Further, judicial mechanisms are in
place and they are being used to ensure that these restrictions are
enforced. Significantly, the nature of politics has changed to a degree as
well, and particularly among the world's democracies, political
constituencies expect these rules to be followed by their governments
and their militaries. In a theoretical sense, law represents a strong, linear
influence on the dynamic relationship between a people, their
government, and their military. It brings an element of predictability to
the relationship, and while it by no means eliminates the fluctuations in
the theoretical system, it tends to constrict changes in the pace and the
content of the policy decisions that are one of the major outputs of this
relationship. The dynamism of the relationship between the three
components and the primacy of the role of politics remain, however-it
is the nature of the politics that has changed, and international law is in a
very important sense one result of that change. From a practical
perspective, although the role of law is certainly more than just another
element of friction in the engagement space, its effect is very similar in
certain respects. It restrains the use of force by the military, and the
failure to follow it leads to real friction in terms of damaged international
relationships, the diversion of scarce resources to investigations and
ICRC webpage, International Humanitarian Law-Treaties and Documents,
http://icrc.org/ihl.nsf/CONVPRES?/OpenView (last visited May 30, 2008) (listing the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 ratified by 194 state parties); Protocol for the Prohibition of
the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of
Warfare, Geneva, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T 571, 94 L.N.T.S 65 (ratified by 135 state
parties); ICRC webpage, International Humanitarian Law-Geneva Protocol 1925,
available at http://icrc.org/ihl.nsf/intro/280?OpenDocument.
283. See Anthony Aust, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE (2000) (discussing the
impact of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties on treaty creation,
implementation, and interpretation).
284. See Fleck, supra note 230, at 178-79 (discussing commanders' requirements to
weigh various factors on a case-by-case basis to determine whether use of weapons under
the circumstances is lawful).
285. See, e.g., Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 213; Poisonous Gases
Protocol, supra note 282.
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judicial proceedings, and most importantly, the loss of hearts and minds
among civilian actors and populations who may be the centers of gravity
in contemporary international security operations.
VIII.Conclusion
There are a number of very strong political drivers behind the
continued use and development of NATO EBAO. Military operations
are expensive, and EBAO would appear to be a way to potentially reduce
costs in an operation both in the short term and in achieving the desired
political end state. EBAO appears to offer more effective ways for the
military to communicate and coordinate with other government agencies
and even international organizations, many of whom will have their own
political agendas and constituencies. Further, and perhaps most
importantly from an international law perspective, EBAO appears to be a
promising means to reduce the amount of force needed in an operation.
This reduction should result in fewer casualties and less damage, and
coupled with non-kinetic measures, such as repairing roads and schools,
operations should be shorter, and more focused.286
Continued development requires doctrine, however; doctrine based
on theory and practice that resonates with both military and civilian
educators, trainers, planners and operators. Because of the very central
role that politics play in Clausewitz's ideas, and his appreciation of the
significance of political and political-like effects in the non-linear
systems that armed conflicts tend to be, it is unnecessary to modify
Clausewitz's theories substantially to accommodate the role of law today
in either their theoretical or practical aspects. The soundness of
Clausewitz's holistic analysis of armed conflict and his appreciation of
its non-linear nature make his theories consistent with the theoretical
underpinnings of EBAO. His identification of politics as the most
important factor in understanding armed conflict allows the modem
reader to easily factor the current role of law in military operations into
his theories without distorting their conceptual integrity. These factors,
combined with the widespread familiarity with his theories amongst
contemporary audiences, validate Clausewitz's theories for inclusion into
a NATO EBAO doctrine reference base. Finally, such inclusion would
promote a better understanding of the roles of law and lawyers in this
evolving approach to operations in the contemporary security
environment.
286. Kelly & Kilcullen, supra note 15, at 89.
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